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The rapid expansions of economic activities in the recent decades have been 
accompanied by a number of serious social and economic problems in our society. 
One of these newly raised economic issues is the increase in non-market interaction 
among economic agents, which is, so-called, the problem of externedity. The rise in 
non-market interaction, as a consequence of industrialization, is clearly exemplified 
with the case of the environmental problem. 
Clean air or pure water were the typical examples of free goods in the classics of 
economics.^ But we frequently observe the cases where a clean environment cannot 
be obtained without certain cost. Some industries claim their need to emit the 
discharges into the surroundings to economize on the costs that would otherwise 
be shifted to the consumers with higher output prices. Residents or firms adjacent 
to polluters demand their rights to a safe and nondeteriorated environment. Such 
conflicts between economic agents become more wide-spread and more severe with 
increased industrialization and more intensive use of the commonly owned resources. 
Despite an abundant literature that is already available in the area of external­
ity, some important issues are still unexplored: one of the unanswered questions is 
the effect of stock externality and government control on this problem. The impor-
^For example, A. Marshall (1920, pp. 55-56). 
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tance of this issue will be apparent with an examination of the previous example. 
Some environmental problems, such as air pollution, stream water pollution or 
noise pollution, are typical examples of How externality. In these cases, the external 
effect generated by a polluter can affect the pollutee in the same period and the flow 
of the discharge is presumed to disappear in the next period. Since any change in 
the level of emission will be accompanied by an immediate response on the damage 
side, the policy issues associated with flow externality are relatively simple. 
On the other hand, there are certain environmental problems that are arising 
from the deteriorated state of stocks. Contaminations of groundwater or a lake and 
pollution in the ocean are typical examples. As compared to flow externality, stock 
effects are more difficult to handle. A change in the state of a stock takes a long 
period of time and any remedial policy cannot bring forth an immediate response 
in curtailing the damage. In fact, our major concerns on environmental conditions 
arise from the persistent effects from the deteriorated environmental stocks. 
This dissertation is written with an object to contribute to the development 
of the theory on the control of negative stock external effects. The ideal first-best 
policy is important in the conceptualization of the problem, but its feasibility is 
not always ensured. This is because an ideal dynamic control requires changing the 
policy variable at every moment of decision. In the real world, such a continuous 
change may not be possible and a controlling authority has to rely on inflexible 
policy measures. 
The basic issue of this dissertation is how the policy should be designed for 
an efficient control of stock externality problem when the policy variable cannot 
be changed frequently. The models developed in this dissertation are abstracted 
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from the general cases of the industrial pollution problem. But this does not limit 
the applicability of these models to other cases of stock externality since all of the 
models are specified in general functional forms. 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. A short review on the theory of 
externality is given in Chapter 2. For a correct understanding of the basic concept 
of externality, the review covers the definition of externality, the source of the 
problem and generally proposed remedies. Based on this review of existing studies 
in this area, possible directions of future studies have been suggested. 
In Chapter 3, Section 3.1 involves an explanation of the source of inflexibility 
in the control variable and the justification of introducing a fixed one-time control. 
Section 3.2 examines the characteristics of the first-best policy and its dynamic 
path. In Section 3.3, the basic properties of the second-best policy are derived 
mainly by comparing it with the path of the first-best policy. 
Chapter 4 considers the issue of the optimal starting point of a fixed one-time 
control. It is shown that an earlier start of control may not necessarily be desirable 
in the problem of stock externality if the policy variable cannot be changed freely. 
Subsequently, a general rule is formulated for the decision of the optimal starting 
point. Another important result provided in this chapter is that the immediate 
start of a control is always desirable if the current state of the environmental stock 
is more deteriorated than its first-best steady state. As a related issue, it is shown 
that a myopically oriented controller has a strong incentive to defer the start of a 
control on an externality if the implementation of a control policy requires a great 
amount of set-up cost. 
Chapter 5 deals with the issue of a welfare comparison of two representative 
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control policy measures for the control of a stock externality: a Pigouvian tax sys­
tem and a quantity restriction. Under a certainty assumption, these two second-best 
policies are equivalent in terms of economic efficiency. But incorporation of stochas­
tic factors will make one policy different from the other, so the basic question is: 
under what circumstances can one control mode outperform the other? Compari­
son of the economic performances of quantity restriction and price control has been 
an important issue in the literature on the control of externality since Weitzman 
(1974). The main contribution of this chapter is to extend Weitzman's static frame­
work into a dynamic structure. As a result, it is shown that Weitzman's original 
model is a particular case of the formulation developed in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents a short summary on the general contents of this dissertation. 
Chapter 7 contains several mathematical derivations that cannot be included in the 
main text, but they are important for the explanation of the results given in the 
main text. 
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2 A REVIEW ON THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITY 
2.1 Definition of Externality 
It may be difficult to avoid a certain degree of subjectivity in any kind of 
definition, but a clearly defined terminology still seems to be helpful in reducing 
ambiguity and confusion. A standard way of defining the concept of a certain 
term is to state what it is. However, the concept of externality^ is too elusive to 
define in such a simple way. This explains why the definitions available in the recent 
literature involve such additional descriptions as when it takes place or what it does.' 
Instead of reviewing the long and tedious arguments concerning the definition of 
externality, a short summary of the definition that is widely acknowledged among 
the contemporary economists should be sufficient for the purpose of this dissertation. 
A simple example of the relationship between a polluting firm and its sur­
rounding residents might be sufficient in conveying the basic idea of an externality. 
^ Since the definition of pecuniary externality is a controversial issue, the discus­
sion in this section is mainly confined to technological externality. Hence, the term 
externality without any modification indicates technological externality. As for the 
definition of pecuniary externality, it will be briefiy mentioned at the end of this 
section. 
'As a matter of fact, there are quite a few cases, for example Scitovsky (1954), 
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), and Meade (1952 and 1973), in which the def­
initions have been provided in the standard way of statement. But most of them 
were easily exposed to criticism. 
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The implication of this example is that the surrounding residents' utility functions 
involve the level of emission as their arguments. An important aspect of the situa­
tion is that the pollutees do not have any choice in the level of pollution. Instead, 
they are forced to "consume" the given amount of pollution that is determined by 
the polluter's unilateral decision. By generalizing this example, we can say that an 
externality is present whenever one agent's utility or production function involves 
a real variable that can be controlled, not by himself, but by (the economic activity 
of) other(s). 
It is important to note that the concept of externality basically relies on the 
system of market economy. The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
indicates that, under ideal conditions, a market economy automatically results in a 
position of Pareto optimality, provided that individuals maximize their utilities and 
firms maximize their profits. Such a market performance is based on the fact that 
each individual is not exposed to the direct influence of another's behavior as in 
the case of pollution. Under the above mentioned ideal conditions, the information 
on other peoples' decisions is transmitted through the price in a market and each 
individual can freely decide his own production or consumption activity based on 
the market information. When there exists an externality, one agent's behavior 
directly influences the other's welfare state without any consent from the affected 
party and market economy does not lead to Pareto optimality unless a remedial 
policy is exercised. In other words, externality is one form of market failure.^ 
When we indicate a particular economic incident to be a market failure, what 
good summary on the conditions of market failure is provided in the classics 
of Bator (1958). 
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we basically presume is an economic system where successful performance of the 
market is a general phenomenon. Hence, the existence of an externality is an ex­
ceptional case in this economy. This implies that the meaning of externality can 
be found in the context of a market economy. The pollution example given above 
can be observed in any type of economic system, but it may not make much sense 
to call it an externality when it takes place in an economy that is not based on a 
market system. 
Even though the preceding statements provides the basic concept of externality, 
several qualifications are required to complete the definition. First, an externality 
presupposes that the affected party does not receive (or pay) proper compensation 
for the damage (or benefit) from the party who generates the external effect. Second, 
either the damage or the benefit from an externality should not be deliberate but 
accidental. These are important aspects of externality, so we need to examine these 
qualifications more closely. 
The first statement that the party affected from an externality does not receive 
(or pay) any compensation is directly related to the perception of externality as 
an absence of market. As has been suggested by Arrow (1970), the externality-
generating factor, which is corresponding to the level of emission in the previously 
given example, can be interpreted as an additional good. Since the production 
or the allocation of this good (or bad) is not determined by the mechanism of a 
market system, the economy might not be in an optimal state. However, a possible 
supposition is that if there had existed a market for this good (or bad), then such 
an inefficiency could have been avoided. Consequently, we can attribute the source 
of market failure not to the simple existence of such an uncontrollable variable in 
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an agent's utility or production function but to the absence of a market that can 
guarantee the transaction of such an externality generating good.^ Therefore, the 
identification of the source of externality can be concentrated on the examination of 
why the market has not been developed. This issue will be reviewed more specifically 
in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
The other condition that an externality is not a deliberate but an accidental 
result was indicated by Mishan (1971). Baumol and Oates (1988) explained it with 
an interesting example. "If I purposely maneuver my car to splatter mud on a 
pedestrian whom I happen to dislike, he is given no choice in the amount of mud 
he 'consumes', but one would not normally regard this as an externality."® The 
mud splattering action can be explained with the assumption that the pedestrian's 
unhappiness is the source of my pleasure. In the context of an economic model, 
the same explanation can be made in such a way that the degree of pedestrian's 
indignation (or indirectly, the amount of mud inflicted on the pedestrian) is the ex­
planatory variable of my utility function. The concept of externality excludes such 
a feedback effect on the production or consumption function of the agent whose ac­
tivity generates spill-over. Therefore, an externality should be a simple by-product 
or side-effect of a certain activity. Defining externality as an accidental result is 
important because such a view determines the corrective policies on externality. 
There is another subsidiary question in relation to the use of the terminology. 
In the case of a negative externality, social optimality does not require a complete 
elimination of the external effect because a reduction in the externality is accom-
Heller and Starrett (1976) and Cornes and Sandler (1986) are on the same line 
of interpretation as that of Arrow (1970). 
®Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 17). 
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panied by the contraction of the externality-causing activity which is presumably 
desired by the society. The question is whether we can say that the externality has 
been completely removed if the exercise of a proper policy measure has changed 
the state of the economy into a socieil optimality. For such a question, "it seems 
more natural to say that the externality has been reduced to an appropriate level, 
rather than it has been eliminated altogether."^ Therefore, a common usage of the 
word, externality, is to indicate a potential state of market failure when there is no 
correction on it, not the actual state that may have been properly corrected. 
So far, our attention has been paid to the definition of technological externality 
which is the main issue in the current literature on externality. In the past, some 
economists would have given more emphasis to the notion of pecuniary externality 
than that of technological externality.^ But such a view is not true today. In addi­
tion, the definition of pecuniary externality is somewhat subjective and arbitrary. 
For instance, Scitovsky (1954), and Heller and Starrett (1976) limited the con­
cept of pecuniary externality to the case of market failure that can be shown in such 
an example as rail and steel industries. When the steel industry exhibits economies 
of scale, even if neither industry finds it profitable to go it alone, there is still the 
possibility of the co-existence of the two industries. The demand from the rail in­
dustry can expand the total demand of steel up to a sufficient level at which the 
operation of the steel industry becomes profitable. Under such a condition, the 
competitive market system cannot lead to the co-existence of the two industries 
^Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 18). 
^Scitovsky (1954), for example, argued that technological externalities are rarely 
observed in the real world and unimportant while pecuniary externalities are 
prominent forms of externality, particularly in the developing countries, and that 
economists should pay more attention on the latter concept of externality. 
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unless perfect futures market is available. Therefore, it is a state of market failure 
and it has suffident common characteristics with technological externality. 
On the other hand, Mishan (1971) and Baumol and Gates (1988) dismissed 
such a complicated concept. They defined a pecuniary externality to be a case in 
which one individual's activity affects*the welfare condition of the other through 
a inarket. For example, an increase in the demand of the shoe industry raises the 
price of leather, thus affecting the welfare of hand bag consumers. Therefore, it does 
not involve any concept of market failure when the interaction occurs in a set of 
decentralized markets. This definition seems to have been derived directly from the 
concept of external economies in Viner (1953). Since the definition is confusing and 
the concept is relatively unimportant, pecuniary externality will not be mentioned 
in the subsequent part of this dissertation.^ 
2.2 Source of Externality 
Once the existence of externality is known to be a major source of market 
failure, our next question is how to correct this problem. But it is important to 
identify the source of the problem as a basis for the direction of remedial policies. As 
indicated earlier, an externality can be identified to be the absence of a market. Such 
an interpretation allows us to point out the sources of externality with less difficulty. 
What we need is to show the causes of why the market has not been developed. 
Several factors can be listed as the potential sources of the non-existence of a market: 
difficulties in defining property rights, market operating costs, and limited number 
®Mishan (1971), for example, denied usefulness of the concept of pecuniary ex­
ternality as "superfluous and possibly confusing" (p. 8). 
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of buyers and sellers.^ 
Since a market transaction consists of the voluntary transfer of the property 
rights, the development of a market automatically requires that the property right 
over the commodity be easily defined and enforced. In most cases of externalities, 
it is difficult to define the property rights because of technical factors or social 
customs. In general, externalities have inherent public characteristics,since the 
exclusion (of the benefit) or avoidance (of the damage) cannot be acconiplished 
with an affordable level of cost. In the case of a pollution problem, it is difficult 
to define property rights over water or air because of the elusive and migratory 
characteristic of these bodies. This is the main reason why a voluntary market for 
pollution cannot be developed. 
There are other cases in which the property rights have been clearly defined but 
high enforcement costs do not allow the actual protection of the exclusive rights over 
them. For example, authorships and patents are entitled with well-defined property 
rights but they are infringed on due to high enforcement costs. Aside from the 
issue of legality, such a condition easily leads to the problem of free riding or easy 
riding^ ^  
Operation of a market necessarily requires a certain amount of cost. When 
the cost involved in the operation of a market exceeds the resulting benefit, there 
®This classification is according to Cornes and Sandler (1986). 
^°Some externalities have a private nature, which Baumol and Oates (1988) de­
fined as exhaustible externality. An example is the refundable cans thrown away 
in a public place. These cans generate both positive externality (as the potential 
source of income for the collectors) and negative externality (as the source of public 
nuisance). The negative externality, in this case, has a public nature, while the 
positive externality has a private nature. 
^^Terminology due to Cornes and Sandler (1984). 
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would not be any incentive to develop a market voluntarily. In certain instances, 
direct regulation by government has a cost-saving effect as compared to a voluntary 
agreement between the two directly related parties. 
The small number of buyers and sellers has a certain relationship with the 
market operating cost. Ceteris paribus, the smaller the number of participants in 
the market, the higher per unit transaction cost, if the portion of fixed cost is high. 
In addition, a limited number of buyers and sellers may show non-competitive be­
haviors. Due to the individual buyers' and sellers' abilities to influence the market, 
the transactors may not necessarily reveal the correct information and the market 
could easily break down. 
2.3 Remedies of Externality 
2.3.1 Decentralized market 
Even though there are some obstacles in developing voluntary markets, these 
difficulties may not necessarily justify direct interventions of a government. A mar­
ket has certain type of public characteristics. Since a market continues to operate 
for a sufficiently long period, the organization of a market and the information 
available from it can be employed not only by the current participants but also by 
those who come later. Potential participants who will use the market only for lim­
ited periods would appreciate the value of the market much less than its real social 
value. Because of the divergence between the private value and the social value 
of a market, there are certain cases where a group of potential participants for an 
undeveloped market may not take up the burden of high set-up costs. In other 
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words, ati intertemporal externality prevails in the establishment of a market for 
externality. If a great amount of set-up cost is involved in the initial organization 
of a market, the sufficient role of the government is only to remove the divergence 
between the private benefit and the social benefit of the market. 
2.3.2 Direct negotiation 
A decentralized market is not the only condition for a voluntary transaction 
of an externality. As Coase (1960) argued, people can directly negotiate for the 
improvement of mutual benefits in the case of small-numbered participants. The 
implication of this argument is broad and diverse. It simply requires negotiability 
as the condition for an economic efficiency and looks more robust and general than 
the welfare theorem that is based on the condition of universality of decentralized 
markets. As an immediate result, the role of government, under such an argument, is 
not to intervene directly but to provide an indirect assistance to remove the barriers 
that work agmnst direct negotiation. Defining the property right is the first step for 
a voluntary negotiation. Another point of the Coase theorem indicates that Pareto 
optimality can be attained regardless of the assignment of property rights between 
polluter and pollutee.^^ This fact can reduce the burden of a government which has 
to find the best way to the division of the property rights between the two parties 
related with the externality. 
On the other hand, a possible criticism of the Coase theorem is that "it is a 
tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient 
^^But the optimal level of externality may not always be equal under different 
type of property right assignment because of income effects. 
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(else people would negotiate something better)."^® In another criticism, it was 
argued that the core in the Coase theorem is empty.In fact, the importance 
of voluntary agreement is found more in a theoretical conceptualization than in a 
practical application. In the majority of cases, there are big barriers to defining 
property rights on common property not only because of technical factors, but also 
because of social or customary conditions. Moreover, the associated transaction 
and enforcement costs may be too high to reach any voluntary agreement. 
2.3.3 Tax and subsidy 
The most frequently mentioned policy measures aiming at externalities are 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, which are used to control the divergence between 
marginal private cost and marginal social cost. A tax (or a subsidy) in this context 
is an additional cost (or reward) to a certain economic activity. However, there 
arises asymmetry between the price paid by one party and the price received by the 
other party. Under a negative externality, the pollutee receives zero compensation 
but the polluter pays a positive amount of tax; under a positive externality, the 
beneficiary pays zero price and the benefactor receives a positive sum of subsidy. 
A possible interpretation of the asymmetric prices is that the initial divergence 
of marginal social cost and marginal private cost has been substituted by another 
divergence of the two prices perceived by the polluter (benefactor) and the pollutee 
(beneficiary), respectively. Accordingly, some doubt has been raised whether asym­
metric pseudo-prices under a Pigouvian tax system or a subsidy scheme can bring 
"Farrell (1987, p. 113). 
^"•Aivzizian and Callen (1981) and the response of Coase (1981). 
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the economy to an optimal state. The question has become more complicated with 
the argument that the victims also need to be taxed. This view is based on the re­
ciprocal nature of externality: without the existence of the pollutee, no externality 
is possible, so the pollutee is also responsible for the problem arising out of exter­
nality. Concerning the question, whether the victim of a negative externality should 
be taxed or subsidized or neither,the general conclusion is that, in a competitive 
market, only the tax on the polluter would be sufficient for optimality.'® 
The limitations of a Pigouvian tax or a subsidy in a second-best setting have 
been mentioned in several papers. A Pigouvian tax or a subsidy can provide a 
correct signal to the production or consumption of the externality generator only 
when the market condition is in a decentralized state. Davis and Whinston (1962) 
showed the problems of a Pigouvian tax in an oligopoly market. Buchanan (1969) 
indicated that a monopoly polluter might actually underpollute as compared to the 
socially optimal level and need to be subsidized, instead of being taxed. In addition 
to such limitations, Carlton and Loury (1980) proved the fact that a Pigouvian tax 
may not be efficient in the long run. 
The issue of fairness might be one of the most important factors that prevent 
Pigouvian tax system from being adopted for the solution of a real world problem. 
The correct rate of a Pigouvian tax is determined not by the rate of emission but 
^®As for this issue, the representative contributions are Coase (1960), Turvey 
(1963), Olson and Zeckhauser (1970), Baumol (1972), and Baumol and Oates 
(1988). 
^^This conclusion is based on the following reasons. A compensation to the vic­
tims may reduce their incentives to protect themselves from the pollution, which is 
the case of moral hazard. A tax on the victims is also redundant since the level of 
pollution will keep the pollutees away. 
^^Faulhaber and Baumol (1988, p. 582). 
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by the resulting damage on the pollutees. Consequently, substantial differences in 
the tax rate are inevitable for the same level of emission. Such a discriminatory 
variation in the tax rate may not be adopted without much friction with the existing 
social convention. 
There are two different types of subsidies as corrective measures of external­
ities. One is the reward for the benefactors of a positive externality (the subsidy 
mentioned in the preceding part indicates this kind of subsidy); the other is the 
subsidy to be paid to the generators of a negative externality in proportion to the 
reductions in their emission. The latter one is actually an alternative to a Pigouvian 
tax and both are equivalent under certain situations. Identification of the condi­
tions for an equivalence of the subsidy and a Pigouvian tax has been an important 
issue in a number of contributions.^® 
2.3.4 Merger and direct regulation 
One possible way to internalize the externality is to merge the polluter(s) and 
the pollutee(s) into one decision unit. However, this remedy can only be applicable 
to the case where the related parties are firms and their number is limited. It is hard 
to imagine merging two (or several) households or combining firms and households 
into the same decision unit. 
There are several types of direct regulation: direct quantity restrictions, indi­
rect regulation through the control of the commodities which are related with an 
externality, or zoning certain activities. A quantity restriction (or quota) is equiv-
^®The issue has been dealt with in Kamien, Schwartz, and Dolbear (1966), 
Bramhall and Mills (1966), Tullock (1966), Plott and Mestelman (1968), Porter 
(1974), Dewees and Sims (1976), Just and Zilberman (1978), Sims (1981). 
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aient to a Pigouvian tax under the assumption of certainty/^ but the introduction 
of uncertainty makes a distinction of one policy from the other. This issue will be 
examined further in Chapter 5. Indirect regulation on the production or consump­
tion of related good is a possible second-best policy when the first-best policy is 
not available for such reasons as prohibitively high cost or institutional/customary 
barriers to a direct regulation.^° 
As a matter of fact, such direct controls as an outright prohibition, zoning, 
or strict regulation in quantity can be observed more frequently than ideal policies 
such as Coasian type negotiation or Pigouvian tax or subsidy. Direct regulations 
are important control measures as far as administrative convenience is concerned 
and the effect is relatively clear and immediate. However, from the purely economic 
point of view, these are often naive and inefficient. 
2.4 Issues for Further Studies 
These days, the study of externalities is one of the most important areas in 
welfare economics. The issues are numerous and the publications are myriad. An 
extensive review on the theory of externality is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
But a short review provided in the previous sections of this chapter can illuminate, 
to a certain extent, the general direction taken by the existing studies. This is 
important as a guide for future studies. 
At this stage, several points can be indicated as deficiencies in the existing liter­
ature of externality. One of the greatest limitations is that the externality problem 
^'This result is similar to the equivalence theorem between tariff and quota in 
international economics. 
^"Koenig (1985), and Lapan and Choi (1987) considered this issue. 
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is generally analyzed in a static framework. This fact is clearly shown in the defini­
tion, causes, and remedies of externality. Static analysis is the standard technique 
of economics. It is simple and manageable. In the specific case of environmental 
issues, some problems, such as pollution in the air or in stream water, can be de­
scribed in the context of a flow concept. But a more careful examination of real 
world problems indicates that our major concern lies in the persistent externali­
ties from deteriorated environmental stock. The externalities arising from stocks, 
sometimes coupled with the characteristics of irreversibility, become more critical 
problems. 
In a stock externalities, today's contamination affects the production or con­
sumption activities tomorrow. The time lag between the cause and the effect is 
sometimes greater than a generation. This is completely diflferent from atempo-
ral market failure and cannot be analyzed with the traditional concept of static 
externality. Consequently, the remedies based on conventional framework cannot 
yield the intended result. As for such practical needs, economists have not yet an­
swered sufficiently. The literature on dynamic analyses of intertemporal spill-over 
is relatively scarce.Moreover, the limitation of economics is obvious in the issue 
of intergenerational spill-dovers; what makes the problem more complicated is that 
'^In such areas as fishing or soil erosion, dynamic models are frequently adopted. 
But the externalities associated with such issues are somewhat different from the 
general externality case because the majority of the models in these areas are spec­
ified in such a way that the externalities among individual agents are internalized 
within the same industry. An exceptional case is Shortle and Miranowski (1987). 
More general externality models are available in the issue of growth and pollution 
in Forster (1973 and 1977), Cropper (1976) and in the dynamic anomalous case of 
Brito (1972) and Brito and Intriligator (1987). 
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ethical issues are intermingled with economic efficiency problems.^' In spite of these 
difficulties, the actual demand of the real world requires that the stock externality 
problem be a very important issue in the future studies of this area. 
The other shortcoming in the existing literature on externality is that most of 
the analyses have been conducted in the framework of partial equilibrium. Accord­
ing to the general theory of second best, there is no guarantee that a piecemeal 
policy leads to a welfare improvement. One known fact is that if one sector shows 
a greater percentage of divergence of the (implicit) market price from its social cost 
than the other sectors of the economy, then the correction policy of equating social 
marginal cost and market price of this particular sector is likely to raise the overall 
welfare of the economy.This is a useful information but may not be sufficient 
justification to use a partial equilibrium analysis in every case of externality. The 
development of general equilibrium analyses would clarify many unidentified and 
unanswered questions. 
There are several other areas that can be indicated as deficient in the existing 
studies of externality. For instance, regional variation and mechanism design to 
reveal correct information are also important issues. A negative externality can 
affect the others only when they stay within certain boundaries of influence. The 
location of each pollutee and the number of these pollutees determine the level 
of social cost of the pollution. The locational factor is an important explanatory 
variable of the damage from pollution but it is very difficult to incorporate it in 
the representation of production or utility functions, which have generally been 
^^For example, see Dasgupta and Heal (1979, Chapter 10), d'Arge, Schulze, and 
Brookshire (1982) and Schulze, Brookshire and Sandler (1981). 
"Mishan (1971). 
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developed without such arguments as time or location. 
In the absence of a decentralized market, the scarcity of information raises a 
much more difficult problem. Agents are not likely to provide correct information 
at the request of the regulator. The issue, therefore, is how to design an incentive 
scheme that makes the individual agént reveal the correct information. This is 
an important issue with a point source pollution where the source of pollution is 
identified.^^ But the problem of information is even more severe in the control of 
non-point source pollution. 
Non-point source pollution implies that sources are diffuse or occur over a sub­
stantial area in response to some land activity; hence, pollutants are not traceable 
to discrete sources. Therefore, the lack of information is apparently implied by its 
definition. The design of an incentive scheme to reveal correct information, which 
is the basis for a relevant policy, is a challenging issue in the control of non-point 
source pollution.^® 
^^Existing studies on incentive schemes to reveal correct information are Kwerei 
(1977), Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin (1980), and Repullo (1982). All of them are 
about point source pollution. 
A recent paper on non-point source pollution and mechanism design is Segerson 
(1988). The issue in this paper is the problems associated with lack of specific 
information on the level of emission from individual sources who are collectively 
identified to be polluting. 
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3 BASIC PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL AND 
ONE-TIME CONTROL POLICIES 
3.1 Introduction 
In general, negative externality problems arising from certain forms of stock are 
more difficult to handle than the externalities associated with flows. Once the state 
of a stock has deteriorated, the negative effect, will persist for a prolonged period. 
Since the problem is the accumulated result of the past history, the remedy may not 
be in effect in a short period of time and that is why intertemporal considerations 
cannot be ignored in a stock externality problem. 
In spite of the potential seriousness of this problem, the policy measures aimed 
at the stock externality have not been studied as much as those of its flow coun­
terparts. It is mainly due to the fact that stock effect can only be analyzed in 
a dynamic context. In a dynamic control of an economic problem, an analytical 
model is necessary for conceptualization and understanding of the basic character­
istics. But there is relatively small room for the analytical results to be directly 
applied to the formulation of a feasible economic policy. Following an optimal path 
is a very complicated business and it may be neither desirable nor feasible for a 
number of reasons.^ 
'For example, lack of information, high adjustment costs, or institutional 
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Except in the special case of a steady state, a dynamic optimal path needs to 
change the policy variable at every moment of decision. However, such a continuous 
exogenous change in the policy variables, such as the rates of emission charges or the 
emission quantity constraints, may not be feasible in the real world. Probably, this 
is one of the most important factors that keep a theory in stock external problems 
from being utilized in the formulation of a practical policy. 
In a market economy, imposition of a tax implies exercising administrative 
power over individuals' property rights, which, in turn, requires a legal basis. In 
most cases, a legislative procedure takes a long time and the decision may be con­
troversial. This means that a change in a policy variable will be associated with 
very high administrative and adjustment costs as well as the frictions between the 
parties involved in the externalities. In the case of other policy measures such 
as quantity restrictions, the same sort of costs and difficulties will be involved in 
the frequent change of the restricted quantity. Based on reWistic institutional con­
straints, one may naturally ask the following questions: when a control variable 
cannot be changed for a long period of time, how will the economic decisions and 
results associated with these fixed policy measures differ from those of the contin­
uous optimal control? The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions by 
analyzing the characteristics of the optimal control and those of a one-time control 
policies in a simple framework. 
In Section 3.2, the basic assumptions upon which all the subsequent analyses 
will be based are described, and then the dynamic path of the first-best policy is 
shown. In Section 3.3, several basic properties associated with one-time fixed control 
difficulties. 
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are derived mostly by comparing the levels of the control or the state variables with 
their counterparts in the first-best policy. 
3.2 Properties of the First-Best Solution 
In order to exhibit the characteristics of the problem and to raise basic policy 
issues associated with a stock externality problem, a very simple dynamic model is 
given in this section. Equation (3.1) is the law that governs the change of the state 
of an externality-generating stock. 
qt = aXt - Sqt, (3.1) 
where % represents the amount of an externality-generating stock at time t, such 
as the level of pollutants in the air of a certain region or the contaminants in the 
body of a groundwater or a lake. Therefore, a higher level of g* represents a greater 
deterioration of the environment. The other variable Xt represents the rate of 
emission. The equation of motion embodies the assumption that a certain portion 
(a) of the emission is merged into the accumulation of the contaminant at the same 
moment when it is discharged and the rest is dispersed. On the other hand, the 
contaminant is to be depreciated at the rate of 6 due to dispersion, decay, or some 
other factors of natural amelioration. 
From the standpoint of a polluter,^ pollution is a by-product associated with a 
certain production (or consumption) behavior. When the emission is lessened to a 
level lower than that of the no-control state, this constraint will reduce the polluter's 
^In what follows, a single polluter is implicitly assumed, but this assumption will 
not limit the argument's generality. 
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benefit, presumably at an increasing rate. If this is an acceptable assumption, 
then a concave benefit function can be specified as B{Xt) where Bi{Xt) > 0 and 
< 0*^ This means that, in the relevant domain of a polluter can 
have higher benefit when he is induced to (under tax system) or allowed to (under 
quantity restriction) emit a greater amount of discharge and the marginal private 
benefit of is diminishing. 
On the damage side, the damage function will be specified in a simple form 
such that it has only one argument, qt, like D(%). It would be admissible to assume 
that as the level of contaminant (%) rises up, the associated damage will increase at 
an increasing rate, which means the damage function is convex in qt, i.e., Di{qt) > 
0 and Dii(qt) > 0. On the condition that both of the functions B(-) and /?(•) 
are expressed in the same unit,® the objective function can be represented in the 
following form: 
V(qo)= max e-'-'lB(Xt) - D(qt)]dt + e-'''V(qT), (3.2) 
I/O 
m 
subject to qt = aXt — Sqt, 
®The subscript of a function will represent the derivative of the function. If the 
function has more than one argument, subscript i represents the derivative with 
respect to its ith argument. 
''There must be an upper limit in Xi. Suppose that a polluter emits X when 
there is no control on the emission, then the relevant domain of Xt is the closed 
interval of [0, X]. 
®It is assumed that the common unit is a money term, which can allow us to 
interpret the marpnal value of the social external cost of Xt to be the optimal 
Pigouvian tax rate. 
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where r represents a social rate of discount. The objective of the controlling au­
thority is to maximize all the stream of discounted future net benefit from time 0 
to the terminal time T as well as the discount social value of the terminal state, 
i.e., e-''^F(gr). 
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with Equation (3.2) is: 
Ht = B(Xt) — D[qt) + (3.3) 
First-order conditions are: 
8H 
^ = B,{Xt) + aA, = 0, (3.4) 
ÔH 
= —(A( — rXt) = —D\{qt) — 6\t, (3.5) 
aqt 
= oiXt - Sqt. (3.6) 
If we assume a finite time horizon, the transversaJity condition is: 
Ay = VqT. (3.7) 
However, the problem can be explained better on an infinite time horizon be­
cause we cannot conceptualize a specific terminal date T, and/or an exogenous 
terminal condition V{qi:). Using an infinite time horizon, the transversedity con­
dition ceases to be valid, so the assumption of convergence to the steady state is 
substituted for the transversality condition on the presumption that the environ-
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ment is stationary.® The objective function on an infinite time horizon is restated 
as: 
K(go) = max r e-''[B{Xt)- D{qt)]dt + e-'*V{qT), (3.8) Jo 
m 
subject to qt = aXt — 6qt, 
By assuming that the initial state of the environment qo is sufficiently close to 
the potential steady state level q*, the behavior of the system can be explained by 
analyzing the movement of the variables around the steady state. Equations (3.5) 
and (3.6) can be rearranged in the following forms: 
= (r 4- 6)Xt + D\{qt), (3.9) 
qt = a%(A() — 6qi. (3.10) 
Since the two forcing functions Di{qt) and aX(At) are non-linear functions of the 
state variable % and the cost ate variable A( respectively, the set of differential equa­
tions (3.9) and (3.10) can be made tractable with linearizations. By taking Taylor 
expansions around the steady state point (q*, A,) and retaining only the linear 
terms, the simultaneous differential equations around the steady state point can be 
approximated in the following linear form.'" 
^For a specific explanation about a control problem on an infinite time horizon, 
refer to Kamien and Schwartz (1981, p. 159). 








r + 5 At — Aa 
oiXx, -6 qt- q*, 
where is positive.® The characteristic equation associated with the above dif­
ferential equation system is: 
— vk — — vS — <xJC\gDiit = 0. 
The eigenvalues of equation (3.12) are: 
(3.12) 
ki,ki 
^ r ± \/(r -t- 26)^ + AaXxgDua (3.13) 
Since both terms inside the bracket are positive, the roots are real and the eigenval­
ues are real and of opposite sign. Consequently, the stationary point is a saddlepoint 
as shown in Figure 3.1, which is drawn in the fourth quadrant because % takes a 
positive value while Xt takes a negative one.^ 
steady state. The asterisk (*) represents the first-best solution; but the asterisk 
on the costate variable A* is suppressed because it always represents the first-best 
solution in this dissertation and there is not any possibility of confusion. 
®From equation (3.4), the following relationship can be derived: 
^Since A, is the social value of a unit of negative externality generating stock, 
it will take a negative number, which can be shown with the solution of equation 
(3.9), I.e., 
< 0, since A(9t) > 0. 
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The optimal path is the arrowed curve denoted as aa. Suppose that the current 
state is at qo- Then, in order to approach the steady state point which is the ultimate 
destination of the movement, we need to assign Aq of value to the costate variable 
at the beginning of the control and continuously change the value of the costate 
variable while moving along the saddle path. Equation (3.4) tells us that assigning 
a certain negative value to the costate variable has the economic implication of 
imposing a tax on %*. If there is no control on the emission, the polluter's .profit 
(or utility) maximization condition is Fi(X() = 0. An imposition of tax at the 
rate of pt on the emission will change the profit (or utility) maximizing first-order 
condition into = —pi. So an assignment of a certain negative value (At) to 
the costate variable will leads to the equivalent result of imposing a tax at the rate 
of Pt per unit of discharge, where pt = —aXt. Quantity restriction will have the 
same consequence of economic efficiency as that of a tax imposition so long as the 
emission amount in each period is controlled to be the same as that under a tax. 
If the initial value qo is lower (higher) than g*, the first-best optimal tax rate 
starts at the level lower (higher) than the steady state tax rate —a\, and approaches 
—aA, asymptotically from below. Since the polluter's decision is made according 
to the first-order condition that Bi{Xt) = Pt = —aXt and the tax rate and the 
emission level are in such a negative relationship that dXtjdp = 1/Bix{Xt) < 0, the 
emission level Xt will change to the opposite direction of the change of the absolute 
value of Xf As shown in Figure 3.1, if the initial level of % is lower than q*, then 
an increase in the absolute value of the costate variable will be associated with a 
gradual reduction of the emission level from Xq to X*, where X^ and X* satisfy 
the condition that Bi(.Yo) = -aAo and Bi{X*) = —aA,. 
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* 
Figure 3.1: Dynamic path of the first-best policy 
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AU the preceding findings in this section can be summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1 If the initial state of the environment ia leas contaminated than the 
optimal steady state (ço < g,), then the optimal emission level at the beginning of 
the control is greater than the steady state level of emission (Xg > X*), and the 
optimal level of emission keeps on decreasing over time [X^ < 0), but the state of 
the environmental condition will continuously be deteriorating over time (q^ > 0), 
approaching the steady state level q] asymptotically; if qo > q*, then all the reverse 
will hold, such that vYq < X*, X* > 0, and g, < 0. 
3.3 Properties of One-Time Control Policy 
In the preceding section of this chapter, several reasons have been listed as to 
why it is difficult to change the policy variable of an exogenous control on an exter­
nality problem. Some of these constraints are incurred from economic reasons and 
others arise from non-economic sources. The main point of this section is to clarify 
the basic characteristics of a one-time control second-best policy by comparing its 
path with that of the first-best one. By one-time control, we mean that the control 
variable is to be determined at one moment of time and to be kept at the same level 
for the entire planning horizon without any change. 
One can, however, easily raise doubts about the validity of assuming a com­
pletely rigid control variable that is supposed to be unchanged throughout all the 
subsequent periods. The reality seems to be that a fixed level of control remains 
to be eflfective only for a finite time span until the time of the next amendment or 
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during the period of prescription. To a large extent, such a divergence of the as­
sumption from the reality can be overcome with a discounting factor. The positive 
rate of a discounting factor will give a greater weight to the effect in the current 
period or those in the near future at the expense of those in the distant future. 
There will not be any great difference in the controller's current decision making 
whether a policy can be changed far in the future or completely fixed forever. On 
this observation, we can expect that the assumption of a perfectly rigid "control 
variable can approximate the problems of institutional restrictions in the real world 
where the policy variables are fixed for a long but only finite period of time. The 
problem arising from a divergence of the assumption from reality becomes smaller 
as the rate of discount increases. 
In a deterministic setting, a constant level of tax rate will fix the rate of emission 
at a certain level just as in the case of a fixed quantity restriction. If the fixed level 
of emission is X, then the change of % is expressed in a linear first-order differential 
equation with a constant term, such that qt = aX — Sqt. Consequently, the state 
of an externality generating stock at time t is representable in a simple form as 
follows: 
» = (%-~)e-" + (3.14) 
where qo is tha state of the stock at the initial time of control. 
For a controller who tries to maximize the whole future flow of discounted net 
social benefit with a tax which begins to be imposed on the emission at < = 0, the 
objective function is 
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Jp{qo) = max JJ' e-'*[B{X{p)) - D(qt)]dt + c-"F(9t), (3.15) 
P 
subject to qt = aX{p) — Sqt, 
where p represents the fixed rate of Pigouvian tax imposed on the emission. The 
level of emission will have a negative relationship with the tax rate p. The first-order 
condition associated with the above objective function is: 
i: , -r t  dB{X) dX dD{qt) dqt dX dX dp dqt dX dp 
Under a fixed quantity restriction, the counterparts of the above two equations 
are: 
jQiqo)= max ^ e~''^[B{X{p)) - D{qt)]dt + e ""^Viqr), (3.17) 
X 
subject to qt = aX{P) — Sqt, 
i: 'dB{X) dD{qt)dqt' dX dqt dX = 0. (3.18) 
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The common factor dXjdf of the integrand in Equation (3.16) represents the 
change of the polluter's marginal response to the tax rate. For a given tax rate 
p, the polluter will determine the emission level according to the condition that 
= p. Using the implicit function rule, it follows that dX/dp = \/Bxi{X). 
Since the tax rate p stays at a certain fixed level under a one-time control tax policy, 
the level of emission X is also to be fixed at a constant level. Consequently, the 
value of function is fixed at a constant level and the common factor dX/dp 
can be dropped out of the equation. Therefore, Equation (3.16) is equivalent to 
Equation (3.18), and both equations provide the same information and yield the 
same solution of X provided that the initial conditions and constraints are the same. 
The equivalence can be denoted in the following form: 
X{p) = X (3.19) 
where X{p) is the emission rate for a given tax rate p, p is the solution of Equation 
(3.16), and X is the solution of Equation (3.18). 
As has been indicated in relation with Equation (3.14), under both of the 
control modes with fixed control variables, qt will approach asymptotically to the 
steady state point aX/S. However, it is not yet clear whether the steady state 
points of these fixed control modes will be greater than, equal to, or less than that 
of the first-best solution. In order to show the relative positions of these different 
steady state points, we need to take several steps. Since the equivalence of the two 
second-best policies is already shown, the comparisons will be made only with the 
first-best solution and the fixed quantity restriction in order to avoid repetition of 
the same statement. 
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The following proposition is apparent: 
Proposition 2 
V(?o)'° > JqM-
The above inequality relationship between the two maximized functions is a defi­
nitional problem and simply means that the first-best policy cannot be inferior to 
the second-best one. 
Suppose that the initial state qo is equal to g*. Then, the convergence assump­
tion in the previous section tells us that the solution of of equation (3.8) is X*. 
Comparison of the right hand side terms of equations (3.8) and (3.16) indicates that 
these two functions V(') and Jq(-) yield the same value if both functions take the 
same values of % and Xt for all the planning horizon. Since X* is a constant, the 
control variable of the second best policy can be chosen in such a way that X = X*. 
This implies that Jqiqo) can be at least as great as V{qo), i.e., V{ql) < Jqiq]). But 
in Proposition 2, the possibility of the inequality relationship F(go) < Jqiqo) has 
been excluded. Consequently, it follows that V{ql) = Jqiq]), which is true if and 
only if X = X*. This result can be maintained as follows: 
Proposition 3 
If qQ " Çg, then ^(ço) ~ •^q(ço) X — 
The meaning of this proposition is straightforward and does not seem to require 
much explanation. If the initial state of the stock coincides with the steady state 
^"The definition of V(go) is given in equation (3.8). 
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of the first-best policy, then there is no difference between the first-best and the 
second-best policies because both policies will have the same solution. 
Taking a total derivative of Equation (3.18) with respect to X and qo and 
rearranging the terms, it can be shown that dX/dqo < whose derivation is 
shown in Section A of Appendix. The* positive linear relationship between q, and 
X(qt = aX/8) indicates that dq^/dqa < 0, which leads directly to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 4 A higher level of initial state % will be associated with a lower level 
of steady state q, of the fixed one-time control policy. 
As an immediate result of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, the following corol­
lary can be stated. 
Corollary 1 If the initial level qo is higher (lower) than the first-best steady state 
q*, then the steady state level of the second-best control q, is lower (higher) than gj. 
Figure 3.2 shows how the difference in the initial states q^s can affect the states 
in the subsequent periods. According to Proposition 2, the horizontal line % = q] 
represents the controlled level of % when go = gj, under the first-best optimal control 
as well as second-best controls. If the initial level % is higher (lower) than q*, such 
as % (%), qt will approach q, (g^') from above (below), where q, < q*, (q,' > q*). 
Even though this result might appear somewhat unusual, a short intuitive 
explanation can clarify the reason. With the presence of a positive discounting 
rate, the controller's decision making will reflect the higher weight of its effect on 
^^The intuitive explanation of this result is given in the later part of this section. 
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Figure 3.2; Dynamic path of one-time control 
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the immediate near future as compared to that of the distant future. If the initial 
state of the stock is not very deteriorated, then a higher rate of emission does not 
change the state of the stock so adversely as to raise any serious damage at least for a 
sufficient length of period. Such a decision will lead to a highly contaminated steady 
state of q, in the long run. On the other hand, if the stock is much contaminated 
at the initial stage, then a more drastic reduction of the emission is desired for 
the improvement of the state immediately and the steady state resulting from this 
reaction will be a very low level of contamination. 
The preceding explanations are only about the long-term behaviors of the fixed 
one-time control policy and does not explain the relative positions of the first-best 
and second-best policies in the near future. A complete comparison of the paths 
associated with the first-best and the second-best policies will be possible when the 
levels of emission of these two policies are compared. 
It is possible to prove that the controlled emission level under a second-best 
policy (X) falls into the interval whose bounds are determined with the first-best 
optimal emission level at the beginning of the control (Xq ) and the first-best steady 
state emission level (X*). For the purpose of the proof, let us define a function j(-), 
such that, for a given go» 
i(?o) = r e-"[5(.Y) - D{qt)]dt, (3.20) 
Jo 
subject to qt = 
Function j{qo) is not a maximized one. If and only if X is chosen to be X, then 
the value of j{qo) is equivalent to those of Jqiqo) and/or Jp{qo). In other words, if 
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X is chosen to be X, then the value of dj{qo)ldX will be identical to zero. On the 
other hand, due to the concavity of the function j( ), if dj{qo)/dX is evaluated at 
some Xc, where Xe > X, then dj{qo)/dX takes a negative value; if Xc < X, then 
dj(qo)/dX takes a positive value. In what follows, the signs of dj{qo)/dX will be 
determined at the potential critical points Xq and X*. 
Since the control variable X is fixed throughout all the future period, Bi(X) 
is also constant and dj{qo)/dX can be expressed in a sinapler form. 
^ - 7 r (3-21) 
where qt = aX - Sqt 
When dj{qo)/dX is evaluated at Zg, 
^ - J - e-")cU, (3.22) 
where = aXg - 6qt 
In footnote 9 of Section 3.2, Xt is given in an explicit form. Combining this solution 
of At and Equation (3.4), and setting < = 0, we can show that: 
Bi(Xo') r (3.23) 
Jo 
Substituting the above equation into (3.22), 
^U=.v; = ° . (3.24) 
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Let us first consider the case where the initial state % is less deteriorated than 
the optimal steady state which is qo < Proposition 1 in the previous Section 
tells us that Xq > XI and > g, for all t, where the equality signs hold only 
when < = 0 for both cases. From this, it follows that Di(qf) > Di(qt) when t > 0 
and Di(g°) = Di(qf) for < = 0. Therefore, Equation (3.24) can be changed into an 
inequality relationship such that 
Since q^ has an upper bound, Di(ql) is also finite, so the first term inside of the 
brace drops out when it is evaluated both at / = 0 and t = oo. The sign of 
(3.26) is determined by the second part where the sign of the integrand is positive 
because Du > 0, and ql > 0.^^ Consequently, dj{qQ)/dX takes a negative value 
when evaluated at X = Xq. This proves that the fixed level of emission under a 
second-best policy, X, is less than X^ when qo is less than q*. 
Furthermore, when dj{qQ)ldX is evaluated at X*, 
(3.25) 
Integrating by parts, 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
where q\ = aX* - Sqt. 
^^If qo < q*,i then ql > 0, which has been mentioned in Proposition 1. 
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By assumption, go < so q} < q* for all < > 0. Hence, when X = X*, Equation 
(3.23) is representable in such a simpler form as 
(3.28) 
Substituting Equation (3.28) into (3.27) and utilizing the inequality relationship 
between gj and q*, the following inequality relationship can be constructed. 
Ifl... > fS - - rbl-• M 
The above inequality implies that X > X*. This completes the proof that X* < 
X < X^ when qo < ql-
Simply following the same procedure, it can be shown that Xq < X < X* when 
go > çt- Since Equation (3.24) is true for any value of go, the inequality relationship 
that Xq < X* in the case of go > g* can be substituted into Equation (3.24) to 
establish the inequality condition that 
A(g;)[(r + - re-'']dt. (3.30) 
Since gj" < 0 when go > gj as given in Proposition 1, the sign is determined such 
that 
(3.31) 
This proves that X > Xq when go > g*. 
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Since X* is the upper bound of the series of when go > q*, we know that 
ql > q* for all < > 0. Hence, it can be shown that 
I"» 
The two inequalities (3.31) and (3.32) prove that JCJ < X < X* when qo> q]. 
Combining Proposition 2 with these findings, the following statement is possi­
ble. 
Proposition 5 If the initial level qo differs from g*, then the optimal emission 
level X under one-time control policy falls into the open interval whose bounds 
are determined by Xq and X*, where Xg and X* represent the first-best optimal 
emission level and first-best steady state emission level, respectively; if qo = g*, then 
X = x: g ' 
Even though the proof is somewhat complicated, the underlying intuition of the 
preceding proposition is straightforward. In a fixed one-time control, the controller 
has to pick one number that can best approximate the first-best path {X*} with a 
proper weight over the planning horizon. This means that the fixed control level 
should be a weighted average of the first-best path of X^ for the corresponding 
period from 0 to infinity, where the weight is determined by all of the components 
of the objective function, such as the level of discount the forms of both benefit and 
damage functions, and the equation of motions, etc. In other words, even though 
it is difficult to determine how the weights are distributed, the fact is that X is a 
certain form of a weighted average of X*. It implies that X cannot be outside of 
the boundaries  determined by X* and XQ. 
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t 
re 3.3: Comparison of the dynamic paths: optimal control and one-time con­
trol 
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The above comparison on the emission levels under the first-best and the 
second-best one-time control policies makes it possible to show the complete time 
paths of the stock variables associated with different policies. Starting from the 
same initial level of go, where go < g*, will be higher than qt at the early stage 
because is  greater  than X in  the f ï rs t  place.  As X* becomes lower than X,  QT 
catches up with g, and eventually % will surpass q^. Since the level of stock is the 
accumulation of the emission, the time when q* intersects % lags behind the time 
when X* intersects X. Figure 3.3 shows the change in the relative positions of the 
state variables under the first-best policy and the second-best case. 
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4 OPTIMAL COMMITMENT TIME IN ONE-TIME CONTROL 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the casual observations on the externality problem is that it does not 
receive sufficient attention until it begins to raise very serious problems. This may 
be taken for granted reflecting the fact that an externality implies independent 
decision making by an economic agent without any proper consideration of the 
effect of his economic behavior on a third party. However, in some cases, long-time 
negligence of the problem until it becomes a critical issue would be accompanied 
by a high social external cost, which would otherwise have been reduced with an 
earlier intervention of the government. 
In the case of a static flow externality problem, a late commitment may not 
raise such a great efficiency loss. If a proper measure is in place, even in a later time, 
the environmental condition can be recovered to the desirable state instantaneously 
and any additional loss in the subsequent period can be avoided. However, in a 
stock externality problem, even drastic policy measures cannot change the state 
immediately. Consequently, a great economic loss is inevitable if the control policy 
is not implemented at a proper time. 
Probably, a delayed intervention of the controlling authority in an externality 
problem may not necessarily be attributed only to the inertia of the bureaucracy. 
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There are a number of restrictions in implementing proper measures on an exter­
nality problem, especially in good times. In some cases, the significance of the 
problem may not have been anticipated before it has fully matured. In other cases, 
an institutional limitation or social customs may block the introduction of a proper 
control policy. 
Considering some of these non-economic factors as given conditions, a funda­
mental question can be raised: is it true that, on purely economic grounds, an 
earlier commitment in the control of stock externality is always more desirable than 
a later engagement? If that is not always the case, then when is the optimal starting 
point of control? These are the main issues that will be dealt with in this chapter, 
which is a direct extension of the preceding chapter in the fact that all the basic 
assumptions of the last chapter will be retained. 
As an intuitive explanation on the questions raised above, the following fact can 
be indicated. When there is a difference in the initial states, and all the rest of the 
conditions are identical, then the paths of one-time fixed controls corresponding 
to these initial conditions look like those shown in Figure 4.1. It is true that 
*^i?(9o) > «^q(9o) S'S far as Qq < Çg, since a higher level of contamination of the 
initial state of the stock will always have a greater adverse effect on the net social 
benefit, ceteris paribus. However, the path taken by the second-best policy is closer 
to that of the first-best one as the initial level go gets closer to qs*. And in the 
extreme case of qo = the path of the second-best policy is the same as that of 
the first-best policy. This indicates that the difference in efficiency between the first-
best policy and the second-best policy gets smaller as go comes closer to q*.^ This 





Figure 4.1: The relationships between initial states and corresponding second-best 
dynamic paths 
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shows the possibility that there can exist certain conditions under which deferring 
the implementation of a fixed control on an emission yields some efHciency gain. 
However, such a conjecture is never relevant in the case of first-best policy. If the 
control variable is freely changeable, then the option of no-control can be a subset 
of the controller's decision making. Hence, an earlier commitment in the control 
cannot be inferior to a later commitment under any circumstances. 
In order to describe it more specifically, first of all, let us assume that the 
controller can choose the starting point of time^ in the control of an externality. In 
some sense, this condition means to provide an additional option to the controlling 
authority. Figure 4.2 shows how this additional option can allow the controller 
to approximate the path of the first-best policy under the restriction of a perfect 
rigidity of the policy measures. 
In Figure 4.2, all the four g's with subscript s along the vertical axis represent 
the steady state levels associated with different control decisions including the no-
control state. Suppose that the policy can be implemented from time 0 and the state 
at this moment is %. In the figure, the curve go® that approaches g, represents the 
level of qt under no control, where q, = aX/B and X satisfies the condition that 
Bi{X) = 0. Curve qoc represents the change of qt under the first-best policy. The 
curve qob, on the other hand, is the path associated with the fixed control policy 
that is to be implemented from < = 0. 
be an exact measure of the economic loss associated with a non-first-best solution 
because the benefit or the damage functions are non-linear and under a positive 
discount factor, the benefit or damage of each period does not receive an equal 
weight. 
^This idea has some analogy with a free-time optimal control problem. For the 





Figure 4.2: Deferral in a control and the change in dynamic path 
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The relative positions of these three curves qob and qoC are drawn such that 
qoa lies above all the rest of the curves throughout all the period subsequent to the 
initial time 0, because this one is associated with a no-control policy. As for the 
paths of qob and qoc, it has already been mentioned in the explanation of Figure 
3.3, at the end of the previous chapter. 
As shown in Figure 4.2, if the starting time of control is deferred from 0 to fi, 
then the change of in this particular case, will take the path represented with 
the kinked curve qode. Until the time of <i, there will be no control and the level 
of qt is on that part of the qoa curve which is corresponding to no-control policy. 
Since the initial level ql is higher than go, according to Corollary 1 in the previous 
chapter, the delayed control will be associated with a lower level of steady state than 
the early commitment case. In Figure 4.2, the curve qode is in a closer distance to 
the first-best optimal path qoC than the curve qob for most of the period of time. 
This observation allows us to contemplate the possibility that a delayed start of a 
control like the case shown with the curve qode might have greater efficiency than 
the case of earlier commitment in control as is represented with the curve qob. In 
the subsequent section, a decision rule for choosing the optimal starting point is to 
be derived. 
4.2 Decision Rule for the Optimal Commitment Time 
In order to incorporate the starting point of control as an additional argument, 
let us redefine J( ) temporarily^ in the following manner: 
^Eventually, we drop this definition and resume the simple original definition. 
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J(qmitm) = max f e-'*[B(X) -  D{q{qm,t -  t„^)]dt, (4.1) 
subject to qt — aX — Sqt, where t > tm-
In the maximized function (m), the first argument represents the state of 
the stock at the moment of starting the control, while the second argument, 
indicates the chronological date at which the control starts. Therefore, both Jp(qo) 
or Jqiqo) defined in the preceding chapter are a special form of J{qmiim) with the 
condition that q^ and tm are set to be qo and 0, respectively. The controlled state of 
the stock can be defined with two arguments: the state of the stock at the starting 
point of control (g^) and the length of control up to that moment {t — 
Realizing that J{qmjtm) is an autonomous system, (4.1) can be re-expressed in 
a simpler form: 
Jiqm, tm) = max I e"" [B{X) -  D{q{qm, t  -  <m))] dt (4.2) 
= e"'''J(9„,0) = e-^^J{qm). 
The above representation implies that if the initial states of the stocks are the same, 
then there is no difference in the controlled level of the emission. For example, the 
dynamic path associated with the maximized function J{qmi tm) is exactly the same 
as the path taken by J(gm>0) except the time lag of i^' That is why J(qm>tm) can 
be expressed with J(çm,0) only by discounting for the lagged time period tm- Since 
''A full description of the state of a stock requires the fixed emission level X as 
an argument, but X is the choice variable and its the optimal value X is also an 
endogenous variable that is determined by q^, so X can be suppressed. 
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the second argument of J (  •) can be set to be zero, the original form of maximized 
function J{qm) can be substituted for the cumbersome notation J{qm,0). 
Let us set the chronological date 0 to be the moment at which the decision on 
the control is to be made and to be the date at which the control actually starts, 
where tm > 0. The decisions that have to be made by the controlling authority are 
when to start the control and how much emission to allow. With a known initial 
condition of the stock at the decision moment (go), the state of the stock at the 
control starting moment (gt„) is fully described with the length of delay in control 
(<m)' For a given state of the stock at the beginning of control {qt„), the optimal 
level of fixed control X is also determined. Therefore, choosing the optimal starting 
point of time for the control is the only decision that the controller has to make and 
all the other variables like X and qt are automatically determined. 
If the controller is given the option to choose the starting point of time, his 
objective function is to maximize the discount benefit of those periods under no-
control which last from < = 0 to < = as well as the discounted benefit under the 
controlled state which continues after t = In order to formulate the question 
more clearly, let us introduce a new functional form J{-), which is defined in such 
a way that: 
J(go) = niax^ [B{X) -  D(qt)] dt + e"*'^J{qt„, (go, t m ) ) ,  (4.3) 
subject to qt = aX — 6qt, where X = « X for 0 < < < tm, 
X for ( > tm. 
and qo is given. 
The first term on the right hand side of (4.3) represents the discounted benefit 
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that will continue from t = 0 through < = and the second term corresponds 
to the maximal value of the discounted benefit under the controlled state that will 
continue throughout all the period subsequent to t = tm. In (4.3), the argument of 
the maximized function J( ) is qt„, which is in turn, expressed with two arguments, 
go and tm- What is meant by these two arguments of qt„ is that the state of the stock 
at the starting point of control (qt„) is completely described with the initial state 
of the stock at < = 0, which is go, and the length of time during which the control 
policy has not been implemented, which is tm- In other words, by substituting 
t = tfn, X = X, and a specific value of % into Equation (3.14), is uniquely 
determined. 
In finding the optimal starting point of control, the first-order condition is 
^ < 0, (4.4) 
where > ço or tm > 0. As represented by the notation dj/dt^. on the left hand 
side, the terms on the right hand side of Equation (4.4) represent the trade-off asso­
ciated with the deferral of the control for a unit period of time. Since all the terms 
inside the brace are expressed in the current value at the potential starting moment 
of control which is some unknown time tm in the future, all the values should be dis­
counted by e"''" in order to express in terms of the values at the decision moment, 
which is denoted as f = 0. The first term in the brace, [J9(%) - D{gt„)], repre­
sents the possible static net benefit when the control is deferred for a unit period 
of time. Any dynamic decision will affect the state of those periods subsequent to 
the decision moment. In this particular case, such dynamic effects can be captured 
by the last two terms in the brace: the term —rJ{gtn) is the pure delayed cost; the 
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other term [{dJ/dqt„){dqt^/dtm)] represents the cost associated with a higher level 
of qt^ than would have been the case with the earlier commitment. Since the term 
dqi^/dim represents the rate of change in qt^ during the time of deliberate delay 
of a control on the emission, which is in a no-control state, the change of qt follows 
the rule of motion that % = aX — Sqt' If qt„ is known, then the rate of change of 
9tm is 
^ (4.5) 
Finally, by substituting equation (4.5) into (4.4), the first-order condition becomes 
dJ{qo) 
= e-"- dm) - i>(ïu)] + m - - rJiiU) < 0, (4.6) 
where > 0. 
The second-order condition is 
An example will show more specifically how the above result would work in 
a particular case. For simplicity of calculation, a quadratic benefit function and a 
linear damage function^ are assumed: 
S{Xt) = biXt — 1 (4.8) 
^In Chapter 3, a strictly convex damage function is assumed. But a linear 
d a m a g e  function still fulfills the condition for the concavity of function J{qo)i and 
simplifies the calculation to a greater extent. 
54 
= diqt^ 
where hi, 6% and di are all positive, and 6i(r + ^ ) > rfi. For a further simplification, 
we can set the parameter a to be 1 without losing any generality.® If the control 
starts at ( = 0, with a given initial state %, then the optimal level of emission is 
By substituting this optimal value X into the objective function, which is Equation 
(3.17) in the previous chapter, the maximized function J(qo) is derived. 
All the required information for the other terms in Equation (4.6) can be derived 
from the given assumptions, i.e., 
^ (4.11) 
£)(gi) = di 
Substituting all of this information into Equation (4.6), considering that gt„ is also 
a function of tm and the optimal starting point of time is determined, such that 
®This can be done by reparameterizing %. 
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. . . L —  »  ^  ^  4 6 i ( r  +  f ,  l o g 4 6 2 ( r  4 - f )  +  l o g ( 6 i / 6 2  -  g o )  -  l o g r f i  
When U < go < 4^^ + ^ ) ' «m " g -
(4.12) 
,  ,  Ah\{v + ^ ) — c/i 
4Sb,(r + S) -»"< «" = "• 
The advantage associated with postponement of a control is shown more ev­
idently when specific values are plugged in. For example, if 6% = 1,62 = l,(fi = 
0.05, r = 0.05, f = 0.2, a = 1, and go = 2.5, then the solution for the optimal start­
ing point is tm = 11.5. This means that the fixed control should be deferred for 11.5 
unit periods of time when the given initial state go is at 2.5. Suppose that the con­
troller has erroneously decided to start a fixed control policy at the initial moment. 
Then the discounted net future benefit J(2.5) = 5.9. On the other hand, if the 
control policy has been deferred for the proper period of time, then the discounted 
net future benefit J'(2.5) = 8.1. By delaying the control for 11.5 unit periods of 
time, the net discounted benefit has been improved by the difference between the 
two maximized values i7(2.5) and J(2.5), which is 2.2. 
As a summary of this section, the following proposition is presented. 
Proposition Q If a policy variable cannot be changed freely, then an earlier start 
of a stock externality control may not necessarily he desirable. 
Since the proposition is in a partial negation, the example given above is suffi­
cient for the proof. 
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4.3 Maximum Delay and Administrative Cost 
Even though the result summarized in Proposition 6 is an interesting one, it 
will not be easy to determine an optimal starting point in a real world problem. 
The complexity of the decision rule given in (4.6) actually limits its applicability 
to a practical purpose. Therefore, if we can specify a bound in the initial state % 
beyond which the benefit from delaying a control is not possible, then it will be of 
great help in actual decision making. Such a finding can save the doubts that may 
otherwise have been cast upon the starting points of control. 
The basic intuition that made us expect the existence of the optimal starting 
point is shown in the graphical representation in Figure 4.2. What we observe 
in the Figure is that, when the initial state go is lower than that of the first-best 
steady state, a deferral of control may lead the overall dynamic path closer to that 
of the first-best policy. On the contrary, as far as the graphical representation is 
concerned, when the initial state qo is higher than that of the first-best steady state, 
any deferral of the control seems to make its dynamic path more divergent from the 
path associated with the first-best policy. Therefore, a possible question is whether 
there can be any economic benefit of deferral even when the initial state is more 
deteriorated than the first-best steady state. 
As for this question, one important piece of information is available from Propo­
sition 3, where it was shown that the second-best policy is equivalent to the first-best 
one and that the optimal level of emission X should be equal to X* if the initial 
state of the stock happens to coincide with the level of the first-best steady state, 
i.e., go = q*. Since no other policy can improve upon the first-best policy, it au­
tomatically follows that no extra net benefit can be expected from any delay of 
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control, which implies that the first-order condition in (4.6) is fulfilled at — 0. 
In a mathematical notation, this can be restated such that 
= B(,X) -  £>(,;) -  S(q. -  < 0. (4,13) 
As has been illustrated in Figure 3.2, when qo > q*, the change of the state 
qt is decreasing, i.e., < 0. This allows us to construct the following inequality 
relationship.^ 
-^TT ^ -«^1(90), when % > q*. (4.14) 
Based on this information, we can derive the following result: 
dqo 
d J j q o ) ,  
dim — —Di{qo) — (r + S)Ji{qo) + f(g, — ?o)<^n(9o) < 0, (4.15) 
if qo > ql-
The sign of the above equation has been determined due to the fact that —Di{qo) — 
(r + 6)Ji(go) < 0, when qo > q* and that Jii(go) < 0.® What (4.15) implies is that 
if the initial state go is greater than q*, then a greater value of go will be associated 
with a lower value of dJ{qo)ldtm at = 0. Therefore, from the two inequalities 
(4.13) and (4.15), it follows that 
dJ{qo) U=o < 0, for all go, where go > g*. (4.16) 
specific representation of Ji(go) is given in Equation (7.4) of the Appendix. 
®The signs of Ji(go) and ^^(go) are determined in (7.4) and (7.5) of the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 4.3: Functional form of J{qo)'- when go > 
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The implication of (4.16) is shown in Figure 4.3, which demonstrates the rela­
tionship between the control starting point and the corresponding level oi J{qa). 
What is implied by equation (4.16) is that function J{qo) is decreasing at = 0 
when go > ql- Even though we know that dJ(qo)/dtm < 0 at /„, = 0, this informa­
tion does not necessarily guarantee that Jiqo) is at maximum when tm = 0. This is 
because we cannot exclude such a case as shown in panel (b). If we can show that 
function J(qo) is a non-increasing function like the curve shown in panel (à), then 
it can fulfill the second-order sufficiency condition. 
We can prove the non-increasing property of function J^{qo) by showing a con­
tradiction that arises when function J'(qo) is assumed to be increasing for a certain 
positive value of We can show that the second derivative of J{qo) with respect 
TO TFYL IS 
- qo) [Di{qt„) + (r + - ^(g, - ?o).7n(?tm)] 
At this stage, the sign of the above equation cannot be determined with the direct 
information given so far. But we know that J{qo) is continuous and differentiable 
in tyn. Suppose that J{qo) is locally increasing in tm for some Then there should 
exist a local minimal point at which dJ{qQ)/dtm = 0,and ^jr^(go)/^l > 0, because 
9J(qo)/dtjn < 0 at = 0 if % < q]. A simple glance at panel (b) of Figure 4.3 
tells us why such a point should exist for a local increase of J'(go). Let us denote 
this point of time corresponding to the minimal point of J'(*) to be as has been 
represented in panel (b) and panel (d). Substituting the first-order condition that 
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= 0 at L into equation (4.17), it will take the following specific 
form. 
- ®) (1.18) 
[A(9««) + (r + S)Jx{qt^) -  S{q, — go)'/ii(?tn)] 
Equation (4.15) tells us that the sign of the whole term in the bracket on the right 
hand side of the above equation is positive. Hence, the sign of Equation (4.18) turns 
out to be negative. This means that 
=  . h e „ ^ < 0 ,  
Ot^ oil, 
which is contradiction to the assumption of a local minimal point. Hence, J{qo) 
should always be non-increasing if qo > q* and the optimal starting point is at 
— 0-
Of course, the above contradiction does not exclude the possibility of the ex­
istence of a point where dJ'{qo)/&tm = 0, but it will always be an inflection point 
just like the point in panel (c) of Figure 4.3. The non-strictness in the sign of 
however, does not affect the uniqueness of the optimality at = 0 
because of the strict inequality sign in (4.15). All of these statements can be sum­
marized into the following proposition. 
Proposition 7 When the initial state (qo) is more deteriorated than the first-heat 
steady state (q*), it is always beneficial to start the control immediately. 
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Until now, the analysis in this chapter has only focused on the cost and the 
benefit that are directly related to the change of state in the environmental stock 
and the emission level. In the implementation of a control policy, a high level 
of administrative cost may have a significant effect in a decision making.^ In the 
practice of a new control policy, a substantial amount of set-up cost will be involved 
at the beginning of the policy implementation as well as the operating cost, while 
the policy is being exercised. For the convenience of simplicity, let us assume that 
both the set-up cost, denoted as C,, and the operating cost, denoted as Co, are 
fixed amounts regardless of the level of control. When these administrative costs 
are introduced, the associated first-order condition for the optimal starting point of 
control will be modified into the following form. 
([B(X) -  C(,..)] + S(q. -  J - r , 
(4.19) 
where = max e"""' [B(X) - D{qt) - Co] di. 
X 
We can show that an increase in any of the administrative costs justifies a 
further delay in the start of the control. Setting the right hand side of (4.19) to be 
zero and using the implicit function rule, we can show that 
dC. [-A - (r + S)Jt + S(g. ^ 
®For example, Polinsky and Shavell (1982) showed how the optimal tax should 




dCo e"*"' [-D\ -  (r + S)Ji + S(qt -  Çtm)*^n] 
-1 
> 0, (4,21) 
In the interpretation of the preceding results, it is important to remember that, 
in the formulation of the model, the controlling authority is presumed to act in a 
rational or impartial way: impartial as for the timing of the realizations of the cost 
and the benefit. In the real world, a controller's decision may not necessarily be 
so impartial or rational. The set-up cost actually has the same meaning as a long-
term investment, not all the benefit of which is realized during the tenure of the 
incumbent controller. 
The controller can perceive that, by deferring the control until the end of his 
tenure, he can save not the interest rate of long-term investment but the huge 
amount of cost that would otherwise be used in pure consumption for the contem­
porary constituents, let alone the possible repercussion of those who are potentially 
subject to the control. A lumpy set-up cost can provide an incentive for an ad­
ministrator with finite tenancy to postpone the initiation of a control policy to his 
successors. In addition, as the size of the initial set-up cost rises, the tendency 
for the control policy to be put off further into the future would be even greater. 
This can explain partly the delay in the start of control on a number of negative 
externality problems in the real world. 
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5 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE CONTROL MODES 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the most commonly perceived notions, among economists, seems to be 
that a price control cannot be inferior to a direct quantity control.^ Once the target 
of a control is given, financial incentives can automatically achieve the target at 
the least cost. But, in the real world, examples of direct quantity control are more 
easily witnessed than the cases of price control. Economists have tried to explain 
the reasons for the frequent use of quantity controls with some factors other than 
those of economics: bureaucratic characteristics of the controlling authority, relative 
enforceability and simplicity of the scheme, difficulties in legal process, etc. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1975) tried to explain the dominant adoption of direct 
regulation in the context of a public choice approach. They showed that, in a 
competitive industry, when the number of firms is controlled, each polluter's quasi-
rent under direct quantity control cannot be lower than that under price control. 
This would generate a strong incentive for polluters to influence the controller to 
choose a quantity control even though it would be inferior to a price control from the 
standpoint of the efficiency of the economy as a whole. In a democratic country "a 
^ Under a limiting assumption that all the information is distributed at zero price 
and the administration cost is also zero, both control schemes will be equivalent on 
efficiency grounds but not in distributional terms. 
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small, concentrated, identifiable, and intensely interested pressure group may exert 
more influence on political choice making than the much larger majority of persons, 
each of whom might expect to secure benefits in the second order of smalls."^ 
On the other hand, there has been a different line of thought on the same 
problem. Some economists have tried to explain the cause of frequent adoption of 
quantity control with economic factors. Lerner (1971), for instance, noted the lim­
itation in available information and maintained that a controlling authority'should 
rely on the better-known information of either the marginal cost or the marginal 
damage curves. If the position of one curve is known better than the other and the 
better-known curve is more horizontal, then price control is more efficient. If the 
better-known one is vertical, then the quantity control would perform better. 
The comparison between these two policy alternatives has come to be well 
established by the seminal work of Weitzman (1974). He derived the result that, 
if the cost and the benefit functions are randomly fluctuating, the ranking of these 
two policy alternatives depends on the relative slopes of the marginal cost and 
the marginal benefit curves.® For instance, when the marginal benefit curve is 
steeper than the marginal cost curve, a small deviation of the emission from the 
optimal level would lead to a disastrous result and a restrictive quantity control can 
reduce the possibility of severe damage. If the marginal benefit curve is flatter than 
the marginal cost curve, then price control is more desirable because it allows the 
^Buchanan and Tullock (1975, p. 142). 
®In Weitzman (1974), the explanatory variable is represented in terms of an 
environmental good, which is the opposite of an environmental bad, or more simply 
a pollution level. Therefore, an increase in the benefit or an increase in the cost in 
Weitzman's paper actually corresponds to a decrease in the damage or a decrease 
in benefit in this dissertation. 
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individual polluter to choose the optimal level of pollution for a relatively stable 
external cost. 
Direct extensions of Weitzman's result have been tried by such economists as 
LafFont (1977), Ireland (1977), and Yohe (1978), but in most cases the changes were 
not substantial. Weitzman's particular methodology of comparing two second-best 
policy alternatives has been applied in the studies of government regulation such 
as Mendelsohn (1980 and 1986), Beavis and Dobbs (1987) and Browning (1987). 
However, all of them are in a static framework and the issue has not yet been 
examined in a dynamic setting. 
In the field of international economics, the comparison of tariffs and quotas has 
been a very popular topic in the last decade, and the theoretical development has 
been substantial. It is a well-known theory that tariffs and quotas are equivalent in 
a certainty case. However, when some uncertain factors from a variety of sources 
are incorporated, and also when other conditions like risk attitudes of the agents 
are added, opposing results have been derived on the ranking of these two policy 
measures."* 
In this chapter, the main issue is to compare the economic efficiencies of the 
two second-best policies, a tax system and a quantity restriction on a stock external 
problem. In the model developed below, the effects of two different sources of 
random factors will be considered: one random disturbance in the benefit function, 
and the other one in the equation of motion. As in the certainty case, policies are 
presumed to be exercised only with fixed one-time controls, which characterize these 
"^Some of the representative studies in this issue are Fishelson and Flatters (1975), 
Pelcovitz (1976), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977), and Young and Anderson (1980 and 
1982). 
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controls to be second-best policies. 
5.2 Formulation of the Model 
In Chapter 3, it was already mentioned that there is no difference in economic 
performance between a quantity restriction and a Pigouvian tax under the certainty 
assumption. However, when it comes to uncertainty, one policy would be different 
from the other in their economic effects because a tax system can take the changing 
economic environment into account while quantity restriction cannot. Of course, 
the random factors in the benefit function and in the equation of motion may not 
be the only sources of uncertainty. In fact, the level of damage is also subject to a 
certain random effect. For instance, variations in weather conditions, changes in the 
number of pollutees and their locations are some of the factors that can affect the 
level of damage for a given state of the stock. However, the random factor in the 
damage function is not the main source of the difference in the relative economic 
efficiencies of tax system and quantity restriction. Rather, the uncertainty from 
this source might affect the economic performances of both control modes equally 
or at least to the same direction, such that the relative ranking of the two control 
policies is not affected.^ 
On the benefit side, the polluters have more specific information on their pro­
duction or consumption environment. But the polluters do not have any incentives 
to reveal this information voluntarily unless their objectives are the same as that of 
the controller. In other cases, these information cannot be utilized by the controller 
^The random factor in the equation of motion does not affect the ranking of the 
two policies. It will be explained in more detail in a later part of this section. 
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because of the complexity of institutional restrictions. In the particular case of a 
fixed one-time control, the regulating authority should determine the level of control 
at the beginning of the planning horizon. Therefore, the only kind of information 
available to the controller is, at most, a probability distribution of a certain random 
variable. 
If a serially uncorrected random factor Ce whose mean is zero and variance is cr^ 
is incorporated as an additional argument of the benefit function, then it will be in 
the form of B(Xt,et). In each period, the random factor is assumed to be known 
to the polluter before the production (or consumption) decision is made. However, 
it does not matter whether, in each period, the random factor is known to the 
controller ex ante or not since the policy variables cannot be changed throughout 
the subsequent periods once they are chosen at the beginning of the control. 
In order to make the problem tractable, we need to change Equation (3.1) into 
a difference equation form with an additional argument of random factor fft-
Çt = oiXt-i + (1 ~ ^ )îe-i + ^t-i> for t > 1, (5.1) 
where 0 < 6 < l , E ( û t )  =  =  a - ^ ,  and 6t is serially uncorrelated. To make 
the problem simple, we are going to assume that E{9iej) = 0 for all i and j.  The 
value of S characterizes the problem as follows: if 6 —* 1, then qt becomes a flow; 
if S —* 0, then pollution activity is similar to the extraction of an exhaustible 
resource. By substituting recursively, the current state (%) can be expressed as the 
summation of the emissions in the past, the history of the random factor d,-, and 
the initial state % where all of them are discounted with (1 — 6) for each period. 
The result is shown in Equation (5.2): 
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qt = a é(l - Sy-'Xt.i + è(l - 6Y-%.i + (1 - syqo. (5.2) 
1=1 i=l 
The objective function with a fixed one-time quantity restriction is 
EMio) = max B Dr^-)' WX, €,) - i)(„)l, (5.3) 
i T r 
X 
t t 
subject to qt = aX ^(1 - ^)'~^ + ^(1 - + (1 - 6)'%. 
t=l i=l 
In (5.3), all Jf's are without time index t because X is constant over time under a 
quantity restriction. The associated first-order condition is 
dEJqjqo) _ p,^/ 1 y 
dX 
dB{X,€t) dDtdqt 
dX dqt dX 
= 0, (5.4) 
t t 
subject to qt = aX ^(1 - f)'"^ + ^(1 - + (1 - Sfqa. 
i=l i=l 
Under a tax system, the objective function is 
EMqo)= max £7^(—)'[B(J^„ee)-Z)(g,)], (5.5) 
t=o ^ I ~ 




The second constraint in (5.5) is the polluter's behavioral equation. For a given 
tax rate p, the polluter will equate his marginal benefit to p in order to maximize 
his own benefit. A profit- (or utility-) maximizing polluter will change the level of 
emission as the production (or consumption) environment changes. Therefore, Xt is 
a function of 6t conditioned on a given level of tax rate p. This is why the emission 
level Xi is represented as a function of a tax rate p and the random factor Cf 
The first-order condition corresponding to (5.5) is 
d E J p j q o )  
dp 
00 1 dBt dX(p, €t) dDt dqt dx(p, Ce) 
dX dp dqt dX dp 
= 0. (5.6) 
I t  
subject to qt = (X ^(1 — S)* -f- ^(1 — S)' + (1 — f )*go, 
i=l t=l 
and Bi(Xt,et) = p. 
Under a quantity restriction, the emission level X is constant over time but 
the equation of motion involves the random factor fftt so qt is only subject to the 
effect of random variable ûf However, under a tax system, the emission level Xt is 
affected by the random factor Cj in the benefit function. The effect of et is, in turn, 
transmitted to the damage function via the equation of motion, and the state of the 
stock is subject to the effects of two random variables, €t and df Such a difference in 
their policy impacts makes the following conjecture possible. Under price control, a 
pollution-generating producer (or consumer) can adjust to the randomly changing 
environment more freely than under a quantity restriction. But such adjustability 
will yield greater fluctuations in the level of pollution over time and it will be 
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associated with more dangerous results than had the quantity restriction been the 
case. 
Because of the effect of the random factor, one of the control modes cannot 
be equivalent to the other in an uncertainty case. However, we can simply ask 
whether the expected level of emission under the tax system is equal to the level 
of emission under the quantity restriction. In the certainty case, the tax system 
and the quantity restriction are equivalent because the common factor dX/dp in 
the integrand of Equation (3.16) is constant over time and it can be factored out. 
In the presence of the random factor in the benefit function, the common factor 
dX/dp cannot be dropped out. In general, both dXjdp and dBtfdXt are func­
tions of 6; and the covariance between dBt/dXt and dXt/dp is not equal to zero, 
so E[{dBt/dXt){dXt/dp)] is not equal to E{dBt/dXt)E{dXt/dp).^ Therefore, we 
cannot expect it to be a general result that EX{p) = X/ where ^Y(-) is the level 
of emission under tax, p is the solution of equation (5.6), and X is the solution of 
equation (5.4). 
Since Equations (5.4) and (5.6) can hardly be solved in their original general 
forms, the analyses will be conducted with an approximation technique. By taking 
a Taylor expansion of the benefit function to a second order® around a certain point, 
where Xt = X and e, = 0, the benefit function is approximated such that 
®If Ct enters into the function of dB/dXt in an additively separable form, then 
E[{dBt/dXt)idXt/dp)] = E{dBt/dXt)E{dXt/dp). 
^There is one exceptional case. When S  —*  1, it follows that E X { p )  =  X .  
However, this is not a stock problem, but a static flow problem. As for this particular 
case, it will be explained more specifically in a later part of this section. 
^The discussions on the justification of a second-order approximation are avail­
able in Samuelson (1970), Malcomson (1977), and Weitzman (1977). 
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B{Xt,€t) S S(,y,0) + Si(.Y,0)(Xt - .Y) +52(.Y,0)et+ (5.7) 
The second order approximation of the damage function around a certain point q, 
is 
DM ^ D(q.) + C,(„ - q.) + ^ (q, - q.f. (5.8) 
Rearranging the terms in (5.7) and (5.8), and dropping the constant terms,® we 
would end up with simple quadratic forms of benefit and damage functions as given 
in (5.9) and (5.10). 
Bt = BiXt + + BuXtSt + (5.9) 
A = ^iQt 4—(5.10) 
A great advantage of using a quadratic benefit function that is based on a 
second-order approximation is that the random variable e* enters the function either 
in an additive or linearly multiplicative form with respect to the other variable Xt. 
In fact, these quadratic functions are qualitatively equivalent to those functions 
of second-order approximation in the sense that their solutions are in the same 
form. As compared with the originad second-order approximation forms in (5.7) and 
(5.8), the simple quadratic functions in (5.9) and (5.10) are easy to handle, so these 
quadratic benefit and damage functions will be used in the following discussion. 
^Dropping the constant terms does not affect the solutions at all. 
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If the controller imposes an emission charge at the rate of p for a unit of X, 
then the polluter's maximization will end up with the following decision: 
P——^y' + B\iXi + B\2€t. (5.11) 
This equation can be interpreted as the inverse demand function of the emission 
Xt, where the tax rate p is perceived as a given market price of the emission. Here, 
the random factor remains in the demand function of Xt in additive form and the 
emission level under a Pigouvian tax can be decomposed into a constant term and 
a random component. 
- (fr) "= 
where X ^  = E { X t )  = 7—(p - BJ. 
On 
Since Xe is a linear function of p, a specific value of X^ automatically determines 
a unique value of p. This implies that we can reformulate the objective function 
in (5.5) in such a way that Xe is chosen to be the decision variable, instead of p. 
By substituting (5.12) into (5.2) and with a proper change in its time index, the 
solution of qt under a Pigouvian tax is 
It — 5^(1 — ^)'~^ + 5^(1 - ^)*~^ ^t-i -  ((-ij + (1 - ^)'?o- (5.13) 
t=l i=l \ -Dll/ J 
Equations (5.9), (5.10), (5.12) and (5.13) are sufficient to determine the optimal 
Xe, and specific form of the objective function for a Pigouvian tax system is given 
at (7.15) in the Appendix. 
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Under a quantity restriction, the recursive solution of % does not contain e,, so 
it will assume the following form: 
qt = oiX ^(1 — Sy ^ + ^(1 — ^&t-\ + (1 — ^)'9o- (5.14) 
t=l i=l 
By substituting (5.9), (5.10), and (5.14) into (5.3) and simplifying it, the specific 
form of the objective function for a one-time quantity restriction is derived, which 
is given in Equation (7.10) of the Appendix. Equations of (7.10) and (7.15) are 
the basis for the comparison of the economic efficiencies between the two control 
policies in the next section. 
5.3 Welfare Comparison of Tax System and Quantity Restriction 
A comparison of the two equations (7.10) and (7.15) tells us that all the coeffi-. 
dents of the decision variables are exactly the same in both equations. This implies 
that the quantity restriction and the tax system will end up with the same first order 
condition. As a consequence, the optimal level of emission under the quantity re­
s t r i c t i o n  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  P i g o u v i a n  t a x  s y s t e m ,  i . e . ,  E X { p , e t )  =  X g  =  X -
This result is an important condition in the welfare comparison of the two control 
modes because the equivalence of Xg and X also guarantees that the optimal mean 
values of the stock variables qt and % are equal under the two different policies 
{Eqt = Eqt), throughout the whole planning horizon. 
In the preceding section of this chapter, it was indicated that the optimally 
restricted quantity emission X and the expected level of emission level under a 
Pigouvian tax Xe are not generally equal. The result that X = Xe is rather the 
particular consequence from the quadratic benefit and damage functions. However, 
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it is important to notice that both of the quadratic functions are not arbitrarily 
chosen, but they are based on the approximations of the general functional forms. 
The fact that the non-equivalence of Xg and X cannot be captured with a second-
order approximation allows us to make the following conjecture: the difference in 
Xe and X may not be a major source of the welfare difference between tax system 
and quantity restriction if the benefit and damage function conform to a certain 
regularity. 
Let us define the relative advantage of a tax system over a quantity restriction 
(A), such that 
A = EJp  — EJq  (5.15) 
We know that X = %«. Incorporating this equivalence result into (7.10) and 
(7.15), and subtracting (7.10) from (7.15), the relative advantage of the tax system 
as compared to the quantity restriction is derived: 
There are several things to indicate in relation to the above result. The first one 
is that the random factor in the equation of motion (^t) does not appear in (5.16), 
so 9t does not make any difference in the economic performances of the two policies. 
The equation of motion is the information about the change of the environmental 
stock over time, and the polluters do not have any incentive to pay attention to it. 
^°If the benefit function and the damage functions are monotone and either con­
cave or convex, then Taylor series up to second orders can approximate the original 
functions satisfactorily. 
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Actually, the policy variables, the tax rate or the restricted quantity, are supposed 
to send a signal to the polluters based on the information about the damage side. 
However, both policy variables are in a fixed state and these two policy variables 
equally do not have the ability to consider the effect of any random change in the 
damage side. The same should have been true for the possible random effect in the 
damage function. For example, if the damage function had been specified in such 
a form as where w* is a random factor, then any moment of would not 
have appeared in the final comparison result given in (5.16). 
The second thing to indicate is that the slopes of marginal benefit and marginal 
damage functions have an important role in the determination of the ranking of 
economic performances of the two policies. Ceteris paribus, the greater the slope 
of the marginal benefit function, the more preferable the tax system is; the greater 
the slope of the marginal damage function, the more advantageous the quantity 
restriction is. This result is basically the same as that of the static case in Weitzman 
(1974). Since this is an important aspect, a more specific analysis is required. 
For the convenience of analysis, the right hand side terms in (5.16) are rear­
ranged in the following equation. 
[f (It) + ^  ("1 )^ 
In (5.17), the common factor (1 +r)/r is the result of the summation from < = 0 
to infinity. The two terms inside the bracket represent the relative disadvantage^^ of 
the tax system for each period. A simplifying assumption on the probability distri­
bution of the random variable will make the explanation of these terms convenient. 
^^This is because the right hand side of (5.17) is preceded by a negative sign. 
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Let us assume that the random variable c* exhibits Bernoulli distribution with equal 
probability for both outcomes. Because of the assumption that E{et) = 0, the two 
outcomes of Bernoulli trial, denoted as 6i and £3, need to be symmetric with respect 
to the origin, i.e., ei = —63. 
The first term in the bracket of (5.17) is visualized with the simple diagram of 
Fig. 5.1, which is based on the inverse demand function given in (5.11). Among the 
three parallel marginal benefit curves in the Figure, the one in the middle represents 
the mean of the marginal benefit. We know that the expected value of emission 
under optimal tax (%«) is equal to the optimally restricted quantity X. This is why 
the optimal tax rate p is associated with the optimal quantity X with respect to 
the middle line. 
If €{ = ei > 0, then the right-hand side curve represents the true marginal ben­
efit. In this case, the amount of emission under the optimal tax will be determined 
at Xi. Since the emission under quantity restriction is at the constant level of X, 
the relative gain under the tax system is represented by the area of the trapezoid 
abXiX which is the sum of the triangle abe and the quadrangle ebXiX}^ If this 




When ej = €2 < 0, then the trapezoid cdXX2 is the relative loss under the tax 
system. This area can also be calculated by taking the difference of the quadrangle 
^^It is true the benefit corresponding to this area will be absorbed as tax by the 





Figure 5.1: The effects of tax and quantity restriction: on the benefit side 
c e X X 2  and the triangle ced. Since the area represents the relative loss that has 
been incurred under the tax system, the relative gain should be represented by the 
negative value of this area. That is: 
= (5.19) 
•Oil -Oil 
Comparison of the two equations will tell us that, regardless of the sign of 64, 
the difference in the benefit can be expressed in the same form of equation. When 
we take expectations of any of the above two equations, the first term on the right 
hand side drops out and only the last term remains. This is only a one-period 
result. The total relative advantage of the tax system on an infinite time horizon 
is the summation of the relative advantage of each period, which can be done by 
simply multiplying the common factor (1 + r)/r that remains outside of the bracket 
in Equation (5.17). 
The same type of graphical representation is possible for the damage side. 
This is shown in Figure 5.2. Since the line in the figure represents the marginal 
damage for a given level of the total damage corresponds to the area under the 
marginal damage curve to the left hand side of a given level of When €t = ci, 
the difference in the level of emission between the two policies is —(Bi2/5n)ci, and 
such a difference in the level of emission is transmitted into the difference in the 
states of stocks in the following period by equation of motion. It is assumed that 
only a fraction of the emission is accumulated in the stock, so the difference in the 
level of qt in the following period is —{01B12IBn)ei, where a represents the fraction 
of emission that is undissipated. Consequently, the additional damage associated 




Figure 5.2: Difference in the damage between tax and quantity restriction 
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when £e = 62, the tax system would be associated with a lower level of damage, 
which is represented by the area of the trapezoid baqtq2- Since the probability of 
each outcome is 1/2, the expected value of the difference is (area acq^qt - area 
^ûî«9i)/2, which is equal to Dii<Tl{aBu/12. If we assume that the emission 
is discharged at the period o{ t = 0, this expected value is the additional damage 
under the tax system in period < = 1, and the corresponding present value is 
Dii<r,'(aBt2/Biiy/2(l+r). 
Since any difference in the state of the stock in a certain period will be trans­
mitted into the following period, the discharge in period 0 will affect the state of the 
stock in period 2, too. The expected value of the difference in the damage in period 2 
i s  ( Î — 6 Y D n < r l ( a B i i / B i i Y / 2 ,  and  i t s  p re sen t  va lue  i s  { l - 6 ) ' ^ D i i<Tl { a B u / B u Y  
r)^. This series will continue in all the subsequent periods and the summation of 
this series is equal to the second term in the bracket of (5.17). 
In calculating the total effect in the damage, what we have to notice is the 
fact that the above series is the consequence of the expected difference in emission 
only for one period. Since the basic assumption of one-time control is that the 
policy chosen at the beginning of the planning horizon will be in place throughout 
the subsequent periods, continuation of one policy scheme will generate the same 
amount of difference in the emission levels for every period in the future. Therefore, 
the total difference in the expected damage is calculated by summing up all the 
differences in the expected damages associated with the difference in the emission 
of every future time period, with a proper discount for each period. The result of 
this summation is a simple multiplication of the common factor outside the bracket, 
(1 +r)/r, and the second term inside the bracket. By subtracting the total relative 
81 
disadvantage on the damage side from the total relative advantage on the benefit 
side, the final form of the relative advantage of the tax system compared with the 
quantity restriction will be equal to (5.17). 
In Equation (5.17), the discount rate r can also affect the controller's decision. 
The benefit is realized in the same period when the emission is discharged, but 
the resulting damage occurs in the future. A higher discount rate means assigning 
greater value to the present benefit and less weight to the worry about future dam­
age. Therefore, a higher discount rate is likely to lead to the conclusion that a tax 
system is more attractive because it is associated with higher current benefits and 
potentially more risky outcomes in the future. 
The amelioration rate S has a critical role in the determination of the degree 
of interconnection between periods. A higher value in 8 means that a decision 
made at the present moment will affect the future state with lower degree. As a 
consequence, the amelioration rate S has a negative relationship with the difference 
in the variances of qt and gt in the future. The difference in the variances can be 
calculated by using (5.13) and (5.14) and this diflference gets greater over time, 
asymptotically approaching a certain value, which will be shown in the following. 
Let us define the difference in the variances of the two policy measures in such 
a way that 
Ao-J, = Var(ge) - Var(%) (5.20) 
= E 
For convenience of calculation, but without losing any generality, we can pick 
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one future time period T, where T —oo, and show the relat ionship between the 
amelioration rate S and the difference in variances, 
6{2 - 6) ("b^) 
_  2 6 ( 2  ~ S )  +8(1 - S ) '  /  2 .  0 
dS^ [6(2-S)f V ^u; 
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between S and This relationship tells 
us that for certain externality problems which would persist for a protracted period, 
those policy measures which are based on financial incentives are not desirable on 
purely economic grounds. With a Pigouvian tax system there can be some economic 
gain in the current period, but it will generate a high degree of uncertainty in the 
level of the future damage. Therefore, in this case, direct quantity regulation is 
more desirable, ceteris paribus. 
In Section B of this chapter, it was indicated that our model can be applied 
to the case of flow externality. When S —> 1, equation (5. 16) boils down to the 
following form: 
. ; when 6 —y 1. (5.22) 
1  + r  ^  '  
This equation is basically the same result as that of Weitzman's original work.^® 
^^Equation (20) in Weitzman (1974, p. 484). 
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( 
Figure 5.3: The effect of dispersion rate 6 on the variance of damage 
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Therefore, it can be maintained that Weitzman's original model in a static frame­
work is only a particular case of the dynamic framework developed in this chapter. 
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6 SUMMARY 
In modern economics, the issues associated with externality are so diverse that 
there are still numerous questions that has not been answered. This indicates 
the possibility or desirability of the further exploration in this area and the high 
applicability of any economic theory aimed at the externality problem. As has been 
indicated by the title, the main issues of this dissertation are those problems that 
are associated with the control of stock externality under the constraint that the 
policy variables, such as a Pigouvian tax rate or a restricted quantity cannot be 
changed frequently. These are the issues that have been examined in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5. 
Chapter 2 provides a general review on the theory of externality and the possi­
ble directions of future studies in this area. In general, we can say that an external­
ity is present whenever one agent's economic decision can directly affect the welfare 
state of other's without any compensation (or bribery) or consent from the affected 
party. It is important to note that the concept of externality relies on a market 
economy where such a non-market interaction is considered to be an exceptional 
case. Consequently, an externality can be conceived, as an absence of market. This 
is why the externality is classified to be a form of market failure. 
The interpretation of externality as an absence of market allows us to point 
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out the sources of externality with ease because we only need to indicate the causes 
of why the market has not been developed. Several factors can be listed as the 
potential sources of the non-existence of a market: difficulties in defining property 
rights, market operating costs, and limited number of buyers and sellers. Even 
though there are some obstacles in developing voluntary markets, these difficulties 
may not necessarily justify direct interventions of a government. We can indicated 
that removing the intertemporal externality in the set-up and operation of a market, 
or creating an economic condition conformable to a direct voluntary transaction, are 
possible solutions to an externality. But more frequently discussed policy measures 
are a policy scheme that is based on financiad incentives, such as tax and a subsidy, 
or direct regulations. Direct regulations are important control measures as far 
as administrative convenience is concerned and the effect is relatively clear and 
immediate. However, from the pure economic point of view, these are often naive 
and inefficient. 
As the deficiencies of the existing literature in the area of externality, several 
points have been indicated: the problem of stock externality which is the issue of 
this dissertation, a general equilibrium approach, the consideration of locational 
factors, and the incentive scheme for the revealment of correct information. All of 
them are difficult problems, but they are still very important for the solution of real 
world problems. 
The general purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide the answers to the following 
questions: whether a rigid control variable that cannot be changed for a long pe­
riod of time can still approximate the optimal path? How the economic decisions 
and results associated with these fixed policy measures will differ from those of 
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the optimal control? In the case of the first-best policy, an optimal control on a 
stock externality requires for the control variables to be adjusted every moment of 
decision. But in the real world, such a continuous change in the level of control 
is never possible. In order to describe such an institutional constraint of the real 
world, the formulation of a fixed one-time control policy has been introduced. As 
a justification of assuming a perfectly rigid control policy, it has been maintained 
that: a positive rate of discounting factor in the formulation of the one-time control 
will give a greater weight on the effect in the current period or those in the near 
future at the expense of those far in the futures. In fact, there will not be any 
great difference in the controller's current decision making whether a policy can be 
changed far in the future or completely fixed forever. 
The important results of Chapter 3 can be described by the relative position of 
the steady state under one-time control with respect to that of the first-best policy 
and the difference of the levels of emissions of these two policies. If the initial state 
of the environment is more (less) deteriorated than the first-best optimal state, then 
the steady-state of the stock under the second-best control will end up with a less 
(more) deteriorated than the first-best steady state which is independent of the 
given initial state. With regard to the difference in the emission levels, it is proved 
that the controlled emission level under a one-time control falls into the interval 
whose bounds are determined by the first-best optimal emission levels. 
Chapter 4 examines the issue of optimal starting point of fixed one-time control. 
The relevance of the issue is based on the frequent observation in the real world, 
where an unduly long delay in the control of stock externality raises a severe social 
problem. First, a general rule has been formulated for the decision of optimal 
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starting point. And then it is proved that an earlier start of control may not 
necessarily be desirable in the problem of stock externality if policy variable cannot 
be changed freely. 
Another important result provided Chapter 4 is that the immediate start of a 
control is always desirable if the curreht state of the environmental stock is more 
deteriorated than its first-best steady state. As a related issue, it is shown that 
higher levels of the administrative costs, such as the cost involved in setting up the 
initial implementation of a control policy or the expenditure required for the exercise 
of the policy, will make the further delay in the start of à control more desirable. 
This, probably, is only a part of the explanation of the reality. As an additional 
description of the real world, a myopically oriented controller has a strong incentive 
to defer the start of a control on externality if the implementation of a control 
policy requires a great amount of set-up cost. The controller can perceive that, by 
deferring the control until the end of his tenure, he can save not the interest rate 
of the set-up cost but the huge amount of cost itself that would otherwise be used 
in the pure consumption for the contemporary constituents, let alone the possible 
repercussion of those who are potentially subject to the control. 
Chapter 5 examines the relative performance of two representative control 
modes, a Pigouvian tax system and a quantity restriction. Under a determinis­
tic setting, these two control modes are equivalent in the fact that both would 
end up with the same result as far as the economic efficiency is concerned. When 
it comes to the case of an uncertainty, they will result in different policy effects. 
In general, a policy scheme based on a financial incentive will be associated with 
a higher efficiency on the benefit side. This is because, under a price control, a 
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pollution-generating producer (or consumer) can adjust to the randomly changing 
environment more freely than under a quantity restriction. But such an adjustabil­
ity will yield greater fluctuations of the level of pollution over time and it will be 
associated with more dangerous results than the quantity restriction had been the 
case. 
The result derived in Chapter 5 shows that the random factor in the benefit 
function is the only relevant source of uncertainty that affects the relative economic 
performance of the two policy schemes. But this random factor does not reverse 
the ranking of the two policies. It only affects the magnitude of the difference of 
the welfare states under the two policies. Since there is a time lag between the time 
of the realization of the benefit from emission and the resulting damage, a higher 
discount rate make the tax system more attractive and vice versa. The amelioration 
(or decay) rate is also an important factor that affects the economic ranking of those 
two policies. When the amelioration rate is low, the effect of the random fiuctuation 
in the emission will be transmitted to the state of the environment in the future to 
a greater extent, which will result in a potentially more dangerous effect under the 
tax system. In other words, the higher the amelioration rate, the better the tax 
system, ceteris paribus. 
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7 APPENDIX 
7.1 Section A 
Equation (3.18) can be rewritten as 
dB{X) /dX  r \  _^,dD{q t )  a  (i - dt, (7.1) 
r Jo L dqt 8 
Since X,  we know that: 
Take a total derivative of the above equation with respect to % and X in order 
to determine the sign of dX/dqo, then 
+ 
which is rearranged into 
dX f [f (1 - dt  
< 0 ,  (7.3) 
d,o + r {[f (1 - '-«)) ' A 
where all the terms of both of the integrands in the numerator and the denominator 
are positive, while the fist term in the denominator is negative. 
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7.2 Section B 
d J M  _  r  _  
dqs, Jo [ dX dq,dqc\ A ° dq,dqo (7.4) 
by envelope theorem. 
d'Jiqo) 
d% b •'0 
d t  ( 7 . 5 )  
= - / e~''*Du(^)^dt < 0, since = 0. 
JO CfÇo C7Ço 
7.3 Section C 
Substituting (5.9) and (5.10) into (5.3), then the objective function of the 
quantity restriction changes into the following form: 




- [  ^ï 9 o  + ~ ^ 9 o  - t=i 
D 
1 -f r 2 '1 + 
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Equation (5.14) can be changed into the following form: 
qt — -J- + (1 — f)*(go ~ j) + !^(1 ~ (7.7) 





£,f = + i _ (J _ 
Substituting (7.8) and (7.9) into (7.6) and solving it, 
aJÏ .2 1-(!-«)« 3 (7.9) 
EJQ{qo) — max |—-— H—"I—(7.10) 
A" 
-[ •Di9O + -^9o 
On 
2 -  x' (7T7'+( '»  -  + . ) - ( ! - , ) . )  
[ ( : - (1-f) '  1 - ( 1 - J ) 2 V  ( l + r ) - ( l - f ) 2 /  } 
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7.4 Section D 
Substitute (5.9), (5.10), and (5.12) into (5.5), then 




= max {(i^) [BWY. + ?^Xl + ?f„l Aço + 
X,  
Equation (5.13) can be changed into the following form: 
9t 
otX. 
4-( l -^) ' (go ^ +  ("•^)et-« • (7 .12)  
0 ,•_! L tS\i 
Hence, £ç, = ^ + (1 - <)'(,„ - ^ ), (7,13) 
»ad E,] = (^) :  -  2(1 -  «) '^( ,o  -  2&) (7.14) 
+(1 - «)"(# + [4 + 
Substituting (7.13) and (7.14) into (7.11) and solving. 
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^/%.(9o) — max | -— BiX^ + ^^22 — 
X, 
(7.15) 
-[ Ago + ~^9o - A  
2 (2^) . i  + -  ^ )( ; rT7)  + ( '»  '  ^) '  (( i^ , ) - \ i - , ) j  
+ I - (/- ()' * '"êr'"'') (' " (TT^ï 
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